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und Außenpolitik

Simon Odrowski

**German National Interest and
European External Action**



Lehrstuhl für Internationale Politik
und Außenpolitik der Universität zu Köln

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Abstract

From the beginning, Germany has normatively supported the European integration process. However, advancing the European Union, and its predecessor structures, has primarily served Germany's own national interest by solving the German Question and providing security and prosperity. Taking the European External Action Service (EEAS) as an example, this paper suggests that also German support for integration in foreign policy since its reunification has been based on norms *precisely because* this is in the country's national interest of security and prosperity. This is evidenced by 25 interviews with politicians, German and non-German officials, as well as policy advisors and an analysis of primary sources. In fact, the EEAS was proposed by Germany in the 2002/2003 European Convention and staunchly supported by the country since that time. By bringing its own interests and those of others together, the case of the EEAS exemplifies how the country seeks influence, the realisation of its interests and a way of gaining power in a considerate and multilateral manner. Integration in general, and the EEAS in particular, might not only be seen as a way to constrain the people at the heart of Europe as Germans but a means to mobilise them as Europeans in their own national interest.

Keywords: Germany, German national interest, German foreign policy, German Question, European Union, European External Action Service, EEAS, Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP, European foreign policy, European external action

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List of Abbreviations

AD	Administrator
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany)
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (Christian Social Union in Bavaria)
DG	Director General
DMD	Deputy Managing Director
EEAS	European External Action Service
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EU	European Union
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
INTCEN	EU Intelligence and Situation Centre
MD	Managing Director
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PSC	Political and Security Committee

SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations

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German National Interest and European External Action

Introduction: The German Question and European Foreign Policy

Germany is well advised to consider itself as a great power [große Macht] in Europe, which our neighbours have been doing for a long time, and to orient its foreign policy accordingly in order to pursue it in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic structures.

(Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 1999a: 394, author's translation)

Political events do not take place in a vacuum.¹ They have a historical trajectory and are embedded in geography. In recent European history, German reunification in 1990 and the subsequent national and international debate on whether this event would sooner or later lead to more assertive behaviour by the newly unified country on the international stage looms large. The alignment of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic with the transatlantic community and the communist bloc, respectively, had prevented both from posing a threat to their particular alliance. That part of Germany belonging to the other side was, if at

¹ I would like to thank all those people who have contributed to this project in one way or another. First of all, this paper would not have been possible without the interview partners and the time and effort they provided. Prof Brendan Simms commented comprehensively on earlier drafts of this paper. Prof Christopher Clark, Prof Christopher Hill and Dr Nick Wright gave helpful advice and made fruitful suggestions for the project. Essential research support was provided by Prof Thomas Jäger, Dr Julie Smith, Dr Geoffrey Edwards, Dr Karolina Pomorska and Dr Tobias Etzold. Stefan Odrowski and Friderike Uphoff constantly shared ideas and gave feedback over a period of more than two years. Finally, my parents, to whom I dedicate this piece, provided indispensable support for me and this project in countless ways.

all, regarded as a danger only inasmuch as it was part of the hostile bloc. It is therefore unsurprising that reunification, which was accompanied by the breakdown of the bipolar world order in general, was seen as a massive geopolitical shift. The prevailing fear was neatly summarised in a remark by the then British Prime Minister Margret Thatcher that a unified Germany 'would, once again, dominate the whole of Europe' (cited in Simms 2013: 488).

Less than ten years later, the new German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder pointed out that post-unification Germany would actually consider itself as a 'great power' (again), while he, however, avoided the somewhat tainted expression *Großmacht* by adroitly and diplomatically making use of the very uncommon and undefined term *große Macht*. Even more remarkable is the fact that he regarded the Euro-Atlantic institutions, such as the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as the framework of this policy. What did he mean by that? What kind of relationship between Germany's foreign policy and those multilateral institutions did Schröder have in mind?

These are by no means trivial questions, as three years later, the so-called European Convention, supported by German politicians of all parties (cf. *Deutscher Bundestag* 2002: 349–373), was summoned in 2002/2003 and mandated to draft a road map for the continent's future. One of the main ambitions and central goals of the Convention was to create a plan for the future development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which had been established only ten years earlier by the 1993 Treaty of Amsterdam and saw the introduction of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1999. In the context of this Convention, it was Germany that contributed a decisive working document in *Working Group VII – 'External Action'* in November 2002. In this paper, Alternate German Government Representative to the Convention, Gunter Pleuger, urged the Union to 'speak[.] with one voice to the outside world on external relations issues,' and 'strive for greater coherence in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy decisions' (Pleuger 2002: 2). Does Germany's insistence on a consolidated EU

foreign policy need to be seen in light of new German ambitions for great-power politics? Or must German support in this context be regarded as an instance of its traditional commitment to European integration? In a nutshell, was this German idea a way of making the plotline of European foreign policy a distinctly German narrative?

In fact, in keeping with the international perception that it was a constrained country, West Germany, the predecessor state to the unified Germany under international and national law, itself had performed a volte-face after World War II. In sharp contrast to the not only unilateral but also nationalist and aggressive ambitions of the Wilhelmine and Nazi Empires, the Federal Republic had developed an identity which was, as stated by the first sentence of the Preamble of the Basic Law, the Grundgesetz, '[i]nspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe' (Basic Law 2014, Preamble). These were, in fact, not empty words. Since the tenure of its first Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic would seek peaceful conflict resolution and cooperation. While it would completely refrain from military means as a way to defend its national interests, multilateralism, as well as European integration became defining elements of the country's foreign policy (Lüdicke 2016: 8; Miskimmon and Paterson 2006: 30). Not only did Germany cultivate a 'leadership avoidance reflex' (Paterson 2015: 316), but its orientation to multilateralism also became 'reflexive' (Bulmer 1997: 67, Hyde-Price and Jeffery 2001: 690–691), especially vis-à-vis the European integration project (Paterson 2015). Therefore, Schwarz (1997) even maintained that Germany moved from *Machtbesessenheit* (obsession with power) in the first half of the previous century to *Machtvergessenheit* (forgetfulness of power) from the 1950s. The country now seemed to develop an obsession with multilateral solutions, so much so that some observers have described this orientation as 'exaggerated' (Anderson 1997; Bulmer *et al.* 2000: 126).

Reunification and the transformation of the world order, however, raised the question whether Germany's reputation as a *Musterknabe* (model pupil) of integra-

tion would end (Bulmer and Jeffery 2010: 114). Would – or even should – Germany move from its specific multilateral and integrationist approach to ‘normality’ (cf. Ischinger and Bunde 2015: 316; Hyde-Price and Jeffery 2001)? Since then, different answers have been given. While some authors predicted or observed more assertive behaviour driven by self-interest after the recovery of full sovereignty (Hellmann 2004; Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1993), most analyses during the 1990s identified a continuity in the foreign policy of Germany (Bulmer *et al.* 2000, Harnisch and Maull 2001), which was described as a ‘tamed power’ (Katzenstein 1997) with a ‘post-sovereign identity’ (Erb 2003: 217).

Precisely from the time when Schröder claimed that Germany would from now on behave like a *große Macht*, however, more and more observers agreed that Germany was slowly turning away from its traditional multilateral approach and was becoming more assertive (Baumann 2006; Bulmer and Paterson 2010; Crawford 2007; Hellmann 2002; Roos 2010). In the context of 9/11, for example, Schröder claimed that Germany had to break the taboo against applying the military element of German foreign policy (Hellmann 2002). Already in 2007, Germany had more troops deployed abroad than any other country in the world apart from the United States (Crawford 2007: 12). In the wake of the financial, economic, and Euro crises, it was even stated that Germany had finally become a ‘hegemon’, albeit a ‘reluctant’ one (Bulmer and Paterson 2013; Paterson 2011). In this context, the then Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière, for instance, did not leave any doubt about Germany’s new relationship with the integration project: ‘For our European friends, they need to come to terms with the fact that Germany is going to act just as other countries do in Brussels’ (cited in Chaffin 2010).

In his opening speech at the 50th Munich Security Conference in 2014, even the former German President Joachim Gauck stressed that in foreign policy, ‘Germany should make a more substantial contribution, and it should make it earlier and more decisively if it is to be a good partner’ (Gauck 2014). Although Gauck put emphasis on the idea that Germany should act *as a partner*, Roos and Rungius (2016)

argue that this speech, together with those by the then German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (2014) and the country's Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen (2014), as well as the strategy paper *New Power, New Responsibilities* (SWP and GMF 2013), co-authored by several members of the German Bundestag, must be seen as an orchestrated discourse campaign (39) favouring a more realist view of international politics (74). During the Ukraine crisis that began in 2014, Germany took the lead in the EU's policy towards Russia with great self-confidence (Hellmann 2016: 11). Berlin, meanwhile, has recently claimed in the new 2016 White Paper to be a power that aims to actively shape international politics through its foreign policy (The Federal Government 2016). For centuries, the German problem, caused by its *Mittellage* (central location) had been present in Europe: If Germany is too weak, it imports instability and conflict to the heart of Europe, if Germany is too strong, it exports instability and conflict to the rest of Europe – both destabilising the continent. While European integration had been seen as the answer to this problem for half a century, many have stressed over the last decade that the German Question is finally back (Crawford 2007: 14; Kundnani 2014; Simms 2013: 528–529; Simms and Zeeb 2016: 35–51).

Although this implies a radical change in Germany's foreign policy identity, moving from an integrationist orientation to a more unilateral and dominating stance, we should be careful not to leap to the conclusion that pre-unification Germany chose the path of integration simply as an end in itself. Rather, supporting European integration had always primarily served Germany's national self-interest. Being an occupied country, demilitarised and economically devastated, Germany's chief aim since the early post-war period had continuously been to restore its sovereignty and to rehabilitate its reputation on the international stage. Hence, *limiting* sovereignty fulfilled a particular function: it was, in fact, Germany's prime means of *achieving* sovereignty (Haftendorn 2001: 436; Lüdicke 2016: 51). Reunification itself was, as Garton Ash (1994) put it, achieved 'in Europe's name'.

Over the last 60 years or so, Germany has almost completely succeeded in achieving its main aims of national security, prosperity, status, and reputation through action in multilateral contexts (Müller 2016: 28). In light of this, Germany sometimes seems to be the real-world manifestation of a theoretical debate about whether norms and a logic of appropriateness, as constructivists (e.g. Wendt 1999) would argue, or interests and a logic of consequentialism, which (neo-)realist and (neo-)liberal reasoning implies (e.g. Waltz 2010 [1979]; Weingast 1995), drive a country's foreign policy.

Integration in foreign policy had also always been approached in a similar way of national interest. Integrating armed forces through the – ultimately failed – European Defence Community (EDC) in the 1950s, for example, would have meant the country's rearmament after World War II. Furthermore, the European Political Cooperation (EPC) initiated at The Hague in 1969 was regarded as a means to expand Germany's foreign policy capabilities (Rummel 1996: 41). In accordance with this tradition, Germany was not just a 'leading player' from the beginning of CFSP in 1993 as the successor framework of EPC. Rather, it hoped to achieve 'a more influential foreign policy role' (Miskimmon and Paterson 2006: 31) through CFSP. This particular norm-oriented but interest-driven approach to integration, in general and in external relations, shows why it is imperative to shed light on the motives for Germany's call for more integration in foreign policy in the 2002/2003 Convention. After all, Schröder had just made clear that the country should from now on conduct a foreign policy within its multilateral structures, such as the EU, which corresponds to the status of a *große Macht*.

One of the main reforms Germany vigorously strived for in the European Convention was an idea that the country had already repeatedly and particularly pushed for from the beginning of the integration process: common European diplomatic structures. The so-called Fouchet Plans for the EPC mentioned above proposed a 'European Political Commission [which] shall consist of senior officials of the Foreign Affairs departments of each Member State' (cited in Hill and Smith

2000: 50). Already at that time, Germany had furthermore expressed interest in a common external representation for the nine member states (Hill and Wallace 1979: 55). In the aforementioned working document for the Convention's working group on external relations, Germany then seized on this idea and elaborated on how the different EU institutions concerned with external relations could be brought together and how common European diplomatic structures could look like (Pleuger 2002).

While Germany described a full merger of the roles of the External Relations Commissioner and the High Representative, including their substructures within the Commission and the Council Secretariat, as the best solution for coherence problems in CFSP in this document, it also acknowledged that this would not be feasible. The main problem would be the issue of the institutional substructures of the two roles, since there were different ideas among member states where the apparatus that the new office could rely on, and hence the office itself, should be located. Therefore, this document proposed to introduce a 'double hat' – hence the title of the document – which would have meant 'the exercise of the two offices by one person'. But even if this latter option was chosen, Germany insisted on the need of a consolidated 'European Foreign Policy Unit' which should include the Council Secretariat's structures responsible for external action, such as the High Representative's Policy Unit, as well as staff from both the relevant structures of the Commission, such as the External Relations Directorate-General, and the member states (Pleuger 2002: 4). According to a speech by one of the Bundestag's Representatives to the Convention, Jürgen Meyer (2002: 1157), and a German Convention Delegate of the European Parliament, Klaus Hänsch (2002: 4), the Commission's offices around the world should be transformed into full EU delegations and become part of this new unit. Shortly before the end of the European Convention, the Bundestag's Committee on the Affairs of the European Union reemphasised vis-à-vis the German government the need for a European foreign minister, as well as a common European diplomatic service to support him or her (Deutscher Bundestag 2003: 954).

The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe drafted by the Convention eventually allowed for the creation of a European External Action Service (EEAS), which should consist of staff from the Commission, the Council Secretariat, and the national diplomatic bodies, without specifying its concrete set-up. The head of this new service would be a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. In line with Germany's originally favoured, but abandoned, plan, this new role would replace and merge the offices of the Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative. In addition, the treaty included the plan to transform the Commission's offices into delegations under the High Representative's authority (Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 2004: Art. I-26, I-28, III-296, III-328).

Even after the Constitutional Treaty failed in 2005, Germany was highly interested in improving the diplomatic institutional structures of the EU. The German Foreign Office's senior diplomat Christoph Heusgen, then head of the Policy Unit, stressed that, even if an EEAS could not be created as the new treaty for the EU had been rejected, the number of staff of his Unit should at least be increased. Furthermore, the role of the Commission's delegation should be strengthened where possible to come closer to the idea of the EEAS (Heusgen 2005: 337–338). Eventually, the Lisbon Treaty that took effect in 2009 actually preserved most of the failed Constitutional Treaty's articles on these new foreign policy structures. While the term Union Minister for Foreign Affairs was replaced by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (that is a slightly modified title of the office introduced in 1999), the new treaty kept the phrasing of the 2005 articles on a European External Action Service (TEU 2016: 27, 221). The set-up of the latter started only a year later (Council of the European Union 2010).

In light of Germany's particular relationship with the integration project in general, and foreign policy integration in particular, what does it mean that Germany did not only propose a common diplomatic service for the EU but has, after its establishment in 2010, also been 'one of the strongest supporters' thereof (Adebahr 2015: 107; cf. Müller and Rappold 2012: 7)? The EEAS does not only qualify as a use-

ful instance for discussing this relationship at the turn of the millennium. What is more, Germany's relationship with the EEAS is also particularly relevant and deserves closer attention beyond the previous findings on Germany's attitude towards (foreign policy) integration, since the EEAS is an institution unlike any other. In fact, it is an exceptional case even within the special structure of the European integration project.

The creation of the EEAS marked the first time in history that a non-state actor had established a diplomatic service with both a headquarters and missions abroad (Petrov *et al.* 2012: 1). Considering the essential relationship between foreign policy and state sovereignty, this new service is, in fact, *revolutionary*. Not only does the feature of sovereignty 'make[-] it highly likely that a state will have a foreign policy' (Hill 2003: 31), but foreign policy is actually a crucial, even foundational, element of state sovereignty and it is therefore described as the 'last bastion' thereof (Wallace 2005: 455), which is unlikely to be integrated. This is all the more so in the case of diplomacy, which is the primary non-military instrument by which states conduct foreign policy. Diplomacy is not only a 'privilege' of sovereign states (Wouters and Duquet 2012: 33) but 'one of the ways in which states manifest their sovereignty' (Adler-Nissen 2013: 186). Therefore, '[t]he new diplomatic body challenges national diplomacy as the representation of the voice of the sovereign state' (Adler-Nissen 2013: 187). Considering that the EEAS is thus a significant step of integration, Spence and Bátorá (2015), seizing on the widespread, albeit not absolutely accurate (cf. Simms 2003a), use of the term *Westphalian* in the literature, went so far as to describe the EEAS as an expression of 'European Diplomacy Post-Westphalia' (Spence and Bátorá 2015).

Bearing in mind how essential foreign policy and diplomacy are for the sovereignty of a state, it is unsurprising that the setup of the EEAS cannot simply be described as a – to use the vocabulary of the literature – *post-Westphalian* or *post-sovereign* construction, but blurs the lines between the two traditional approaches to integration: intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. The most obvious exam-

ple of this 'sui generis', 'hybrid', or 'interstitial' character (Bátora 2013a: 20, 2013b; Onestini 2015: 65; Spence 2015; Tannous 2015) is the fact that only about 60 per cent of the staff of the EEAS are EU civil servants while a third are national officials of the member states' foreign ministries (Council of the European Union 2010: Art. 6(9)).

Considering this remarkable character of the EEAS, which is clearly an EU body but reserves an important role for the member states, it is indeed surprising how little research has as yet been conducted on the perspective of the EU member states on this service. The literature so far has largely focused on identifying challenges with which the EEAS is confronted and describing inter-institutional balances between the EEAS and other institutions of the EU (Adler-Nissen 2015: 17). But how do the member states regard the EEAS? How do they cooperate with the service? What were their motives for establishing a common diplomatic institution? And what goals do they pursue within and through it? The greatest exceptions are Balfour and Raik (2015) who have written a chapter on national adaptation to European diplomacy. They also edited both a paper (2013) and, together with Carta, a book (Balfour *et al.* 2015) consisting of several short articles on different *foreign ministries* of the member states and their interaction with the EEAS. However, perspectives on the question of *why* member states – especially bigger member states with large diplomatic networks and capabilities – participate in the service are almost absent (cf. Adler-Nissen 2015: 17–18). Pilegaard and Kluth (2012), who use a neorealist framework to explain British and French motives, are an exception.

Similarly, literature on Germany and the EEAS is limited to short contributions by Cornelius Adebahr (2013, 2015) to the aforementioned edited publications by Balfour and Raik, which, however, confines itself to a brief discussion of the perspective of the German Foreign Office, the Auswärtiges Amt, on the EEAS during the first three years of its existence. Providing a short descriptive overview on the evolution of the EEAS between 2009 and 2015, Helwig (2016) explains *that*, rather than *why*, Germany supported the EEAS in these years. The same is true for Müller

and Rappold (2012) who, stressing *that* Germany proposed and, later, supported the establishment of the EEAS, present a brief discussion of the prospective relationship between Germany and the EEAS and what problems and opportunities the service might create for the country. Helwig (2017) furthermore published a draft for a conference. By briefly discussing three case studies, he raises the question when Germany made use of the EU as a diplomatic actor. However, reference to the EEAS as such is very limited. What is more, similarly to the other contributions, this text does not pose the question *of why* Germany proposed and supported a common diplomatic service for the EU.

In light of the debate on Germany's increasing power and a more self-confident stance in international affairs since reunification, as well as its special relationship with European integration, such a gap in scholarship is both surprising and regrettable. In order to contribute to Germany's relationship with the EEAS, I have previously examined Germany's more general *current perspective* on the EEAS between 2010 and 2015 *exploratively*: What do current German actors actually know about the service? How do they assess its performance as a new supranational bureaucracy? And how might the EEAS develop in the future? (Odrowski 2017).

However, the crucial and much more decisive questions remain unanswered. In fact, especially in light of Germany's particular approach towards the integration process explained above, my previous work has reinforced the impression that several important issues deserve closer attention (cf. Odrowski 2017: 105–109): What were the motives of Germany – ardent supporter and inventor of the EEAS – for proposing common diplomatic structures shortly after its chancellor had claimed that Germany was a *große Macht*? Must Germany's support for the service be seen as a normatively driven commitment to the ideal of European integration? Is it an instance of its traditional multilateral approach to foreign policy in its own interest? Or, in times of a completely new European and global geopolitical situation, as well as a growing German self-confidence, must Germany's support for the EEAS

be seen as an attempt to increase its power and eventually dominate European foreign policy?

Furthermore, as Germany's support for the EEAS has not become weaker until today, how did German motivations change over the next twenty years or so? Pilegaard and Kluth (2012) state that France and Britain take part in this enterprise of common European diplomacy in order to compensate for their decreasing influence on the global stage. Therefore, it is worthwhile and normatively and academically imperative to shed light on the question of why a Germany that is regaining strength and power in Europe but also suffering from waning influence beyond Europe (Maull 2014: 7), supports this service. After all, it had always seen integration as an essential part of its national interest and a way to manifest its sovereignty, as well as to extend its capacity to act. Furthermore, what goals does the country now pursue through the EEAS? Does the character of the EEAS between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism provide an opportunity to 'upload' national interests and use the common strength and reputation of the EU to defend them? In short, this paper aims to find answers for *why* Germany has been supporting this revolutionary service. Hence, I approach questions which have been hitherto untouched by scholarship.

By identifying the lines of argumentation and leitmotifs put forward by Germany from the late 1990s, this paper will thus close a clear gap in the literature. The first chapter will investigate Germany's reasoning behind supporting a common diplomatic service against the background of the events of the 1990s and the country's approach to multilateralism in general, and European integration in particular, since reunification. In this context, I will especially focus on the period before and during the Convention on the Future of Europe (2002–2003) because it drafted the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe which included the German proposal to establish a common diplomatic service. While the Constitutional Treaty was rejected by referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005, Germany's influence, as elaborated above, increased during the first decade of the 21st century.

Furthermore, a change of government took place in 2005 when the social democrat Schröder was replaced by conservative Angela Merkel. In the second chapter, I will, therefore, move on to the post-Convention period and discuss whether Germany's motives for supporting the creation of the EEAS and a strengthened role for the High Representative changed. This period is key to this paper in that the Lisbon Treaty, which replaced the rejected Constitutional Treaty, was signed only two years later, in 2007, and came into force in 2009; in 2010, the Council adopted the final legal acts for the EEAS in 2010. The last chapter will then deal with the issue of what role the EEAS played for Germany since its creation in 2010: Where do German officials work in the EEAS and what kinds of interests do they pursue? What does Germany expect from the service? What policies does it want to be dealt with by the EEAS?

The major part of the subsequent analysis will be based on 25 expert interviews with German politicians, German officials in Berlin and Brussels, non-German EEAS/EU officials and policy advisors. All interviews, most of which were face-to-face interviews in Berlin, Brussels, and Cambridge, were conducted between 16 May and 4 July 2017 (see references). As is the case with any research method, interviewing has both advantages and disadvantages. Although it is generally assumed that the knowledge gained in interviews can, to a certain degree, be detached from the person (Helfferich 2014: 570), it is important to keep two things in mind. *First*, memories are not objective information that can be retrieved like data from a hard disk. Rather, each time they are thought, memories are reconstructed in a – sometimes slightly, sometimes significantly – different way. Interviewing a broad set of people, however, helps to reduce this effect.

The *second* objection to the assumption of objectivity is closely related to this first one and refers to the idea that different people perceive, think of, and memorise events, things, and people in very different, sometimes even contrasting ways: 'In this sense, multiple and even conflicting versions of the same event or object can be true at the same time' (Rubin and Rubin 2012: 27). This is more problematic if we

ask for facts. The subsequent analysis, however, is concerned with motivations and interests, for which interviewing might actually be the better research approach. This paper does not refute the idea of an objective reality – geography, for example, is a fact and not a social construction. Nevertheless, the perception of actors is important: Is Germany actually once again dominating the whole of Europe? Not least the recent Euro crisis has shown that there is significant variation in the perception of this issue. In that sense, hard data is less useful while qualitative methods, such as interviews, ‘help us establish how people understand their world’ (Marsh and Furlong 2002: 27). Furthermore, interviewing different people with different views might also help to understand the apparently complex relationship between Germany and the integration project explained before.

Regardless, in order to understand Germany’s approach comprehensively, triangulation is the key (cf. Read and Marsh 2002: 237). This is why not only members of the German foreign policy system but also policy advisors as well non-German EU/EEAS officials, who are not part thereof, were interviewed. In addition to variation within the method of interviewing, documents, such as parliamentary protocols, parliamentary motions and requests to the government, governmental statements, and speeches of decision-makers, are also taken into account in order to complement the findings from the interviews.

1 A new Geopolitics: Germany’s Interest in the EEAS from 1998 to 2005

The 1990s challenged the identity which Germany had developed over the previous 50 years or so. As indicated above, German reunification in the wake of the end of the Cold War triggered a heated debate about the potential for renewed German hegemony in Europe. What is more, shortly after Germany’s reunification, post-Cold War Europe was once again confronted with massive conflicts in the Balkans. While this affected Europe as a whole, it was particularly dramatic for Germany.

Having refrained from military action since May 1945, Germany was placed in a dilemma by massive human rights violations in the Balkans, culminating in the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica: Could the country, with the bitterest aftertaste of the Holocaust, stand on the sidelines? If not, could it, after decades of only non-combat missions, send the Bundeswehr to wage Germany's first war after the disastrous experience of World War II?

Deciding what precisely was meant by its constitutionally enshrined 'determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe' (Basic Law 2014, Preamble) was becoming increasingly difficult. In the Two Plus Four Treaty signed in 1990, Germany had reaffirmed 'that only peace will emanate from German soil' (Two Plus Four Treaty 1990: Art. 2). Hence the *Kohl doctrine*, which was named after the so-called *Chancellor of Reunification* Helmut Kohl, drew the conclusion to forbid German military action in areas that had been occupied by the Wehrmacht – although several fighter aircrafts of the Luftwaffe were dispatched to Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of NATO's 1995 Operation Deliberate Force which was mandated by the Security Council of the United Nations (UN). Insofar as World War II and the Holocaust were inextricably linked, the situation revealed the tension between Germany's traditional imperatives to prevent both war and genocide in Europe, both stemming from the experience in the first half of the 20th century.

This was concisely summed up by Simms (2013: 494): 'Auschwitz became an argument for allowing ethnic cleansing'.

Justifying the Luftwaffe's participation in NATO's Operation Allied Forces from March to June 1999 as an intervention to stop Slobodan Milošević's human rights abuses in Kosovo, the then German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer stressed that he indeed also believed 'in two principles: never again war and never again Auschwitz'. The conclusion he drew, however, was completely antithetical to the Kohl doctrine. Due to the *Fischer doctrine*, 'the prerequisite for peace is that people are not murdered, that people are not expelled, that women are not raped. That is the prerequisite for peace!' (Fischer 1999a: 2; cf. Simms 2003b). Eventually, war had

become a necessity to promote peace. While many had feared another German domination of Europe after the country's reunification, these debates show how much Germany actually still believed in its traditional imperatives and how much it struggled with deciding between two of them in light of one of the main principles of its foreign policy: the promotion of peace. Nevertheless, it adhered closely to another principle in all of its decisions: multilateralism. Even though NATO's air strikes were not covered by a clear mandate of the UN, Germany's air force acted only within this multilateral framework of the North Atlantic Alliance. This exhibits the country's strong belief that multilateralism, also in common action towards third countries, is the key to achieving other goals, including peace and, thereby, security and prosperity for Germany.

Given the topic of this paper, it is important to have revisited this particular foreign policy debate in the context of the Balkan conflicts for two reasons: *First*, despite their divergent conclusions, both the Kohl and the Fischer doctrines clearly reflect the lessons Germany had learned in the 20th century: that peace for itself, in Europe, and in the world, as well as multilateralism are the essentials and driving forces of its foreign policy. Although a new world order called for readjustment of Germany's role and Schröder was making use of great power vocabulary, these two principles proved to be constants in German foreign policy. While the 1990s challenged Germany's traditional identity – *forgetfulness of power* versus reunification and its increasing weight, *never again Auschwitz* versus Srebrenica, and *never again war* versus Kosovo – they did not wipe these principles away. Rather, Germany's traditional foreign policy principles were reemphasised by the response to the challenges in the Balkans. The *first argument* of this chapter will, therefore, demonstrate how Germany's proposal and support for a common diplomatic service were driven by its reemphasised, *value-based but interest-driven*, conviction that not only multilateralism but also its most extreme form, integration, was the best road for Germany. This is the *general condition* why Germany was not only passively willing to accept but also actively pushing for integration in foreign policy.

Second, Germany regarded a common diplomatic service with a European foreign minister as its head as the best response to the Balkan crisis itself. Only Europe – neither NATO, nor the UN, let alone Germany on its own – would be capable of giving an answer to this new geopolitics in the long run. In that regard, this chapter will in a *second step* show how the Balkan crisis also directly triggered the German proposal for a common diplomatic service. Regardless, this should not hide a *third factor* which also drove Germany's support for new common European foreign policy institutions: Europe would carry much more weight on the global scene than Germany on its own. This was not a new debate but had been going on since the early days of the Communities. However, once the discussion about a common diplomatic service with a European foreign minister as its head had been kicked off, Germany seized on this globalisation narrative as it regarded the EEAS as a potential means to promote and safeguard both its general, *value-based and interest-driven*, convictions and also more particular national interests on the global scene.

While it is often crucial to understand what *really* happened, it is, as indicated above, in some cases even more important to get a sense of what decision-makers *think* or *believe* the reality is or was. In order to start with the *first argument* of this chapter, it is thus worth considering Joschka Fischer's famous 2000 speech *Vom Staatenverbund zur Föderation* (From Confederation to Federation) at Humboldt University of Berlin. Fischer explained that, in his eyes, the 'core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European balance of power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, a rejection which took the form of closer meshing of vital interests and the transfer of nation state sovereign rights to supranational European institutions' (Fischer 2000a: 2). In so doing, Fischer implicitly referred to the aforementioned idea that integration, the extreme form of the principle of multilateralism, in Europe had solved the German problem by eliminating power politics and a struggle for hegemony in Europe. Regardless, this does not mean that integration is only a value in itself and national interests had, in the context of solving the

German problem, ceased to exist. In a statement on one of the major crises of the history of the integration project, when the European Commission resigned *en bloc* in 1999 because of corruption allegations, Fischer explicitly explained how European integration must be regarded as the guarantor of German interests:

Germany owes a lot to Europe. Our country is the big winner, not only economically but also in terms of security policy, history and culture. The burdens of our central location [Mittellage] were lifted from us in the integration process. Unification would not have been possible without the approval of our European partners. For decades, saying 'yes' to integration has been a democratic fundamental consensus in Germany. Loosening our European bonds now would be a wrong track [Irrweg] and a dangerous step back, which would not only harm Europe but, above all, ourselves. (Fischer 1999b, author's translation, emphasis mine)

According to Fischer, integration had not only given an answer to the German Question by dispersing the burdens of its *Mittellage*, but the country also benefited considerably from this solution, probably more than any other country in Europe, as it brought prosperity and security. While the introduction outlined that this is a perspective shared by many scholars, it is decisive that Fischer as the country's foreign minister also acknowledged this idea. It is furthermore important to note that Fischer refers to a very recent event, reunification, in order to illustrate why 'Germany owes a lot to Europe'. The retired German senior diplomat Thomas Matussek, who served as the head of the office of former German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (1991–1992), stressed that a generally very positive attitude towards the European integration project 'lies in the DNA of a whole generation of diplomats' that worked under Genscher who served from 1974 to 1992 and strived for overcoming both Germany's and Europe's division (Interview 5).

Such perception of the integration process as an answer to the German problem in the country's interests was widely shared at that time. The new basic programme of Fischer's Alliance 90/The Greens adopted in 2002, just a few months before a common diplomatic service was proposed by Germany, stated: 'We reject the idea of *separate paths* in power politics, hegemonic aspirations and nationalism, and favour instead *political self-restraint* and international integration. Alliance 90/The Greens foreign policy is committed to the process of European unification. Integra-

tion has granted Europe a historically unprecedented period of peace and prosperity' (Alliance 90/The Greens 2002: 114, emphasis mine). Regardless of whether one agrees with the idea of a German *Sonderweg* from an academic point of view, it is important to note that the original text of the 2002 party programme makes use of the plural of this particular term, which was then translated by 'separate paths'.

The hypothesis of a German *Sonderweg* assumes that the German path of democratisation deviated from a normal European one. France and England had experienced a parallel evolution of liberal and democratic ideas on the one hand and of the nation state on the other hand. In contrast, the '*verspätete Nation*' (belated nation) (Plessner 1959) experienced the establishment of a state *von oben* (from above) and only very late, in 1871. Lacking natural borders, *Germany* was a concept defined more by commonality in language and culture rather than geography. In fact, the lands at the heart of Europe were fragmented into a *Flickenteppich* (carpet patchwork) of small states, commonly described as particularism. Therefore, the creation of statehood in Germany happened late and is assumed to be much more built on *Volkstum* (folkdom, nationhood) rather than liberal-democratic emancipation. This *Sonderwegthese* is closely linked to the aforementioned German Question. On the one hand, particularism, or *Kleinstaaterei* (proliferation of small states), literally laid the ground for one of the incarnations of the German problem: that is, the import of instability into Europe's centre. On the other hand, the belated creation of statehood based on *Volkstum* is said to have eventually made the *Wilhelmine Griff nach der Weltmacht* (Bid for World Power) (Fischer 2000 [1961]) and Hitler possible (Fischer 1988: 218–220). This is what the Greens called 'power politics, hegemonic aspirations and nationalism' that need to be avoided – and it is the other incarnation of the German problem: that is, the export of conflict to the rest of Europe.

A statement by Frithjof Schmidt, an interviewed member of the committee for the 2002 basic programme of the Greens and now member of the Bundestag, reflects these ideas with regard to this essay's key question of why Germany proposed the establishment of common foreign policy institutions: 'For the Greens,

progress in European integration was a decisive parameter for the *political development of Germany as a democratic country* in Europe. This is how we also formulated it faithfully in the basic programme. And there has always been the question *how to forge ahead in the area of foreign policy with a common European identity*' (Interview 3, author's translation, emphasis mine). From a German point of view, this particular German history and geography must not be seen as a constraint but rather an advantage. Commenting on the semantic difference between self-restraint and inclusion, Schmidt explained: 'I think that one of the lessons of history is that European integration can have an inclusive impact, which you, if you will, could also describe as self-restraint [*Selbstbeschränkung*]. But I think it is, to a certain extent, an ambivalent term because self-restraint has this connotation of waiving something. And I think inclusion [*Einbindung*] is more appropriate insofar as it does not have this connotation' (Interview 3, author's translation). From this point of view, institutional integration in common foreign policy must not so much be seen as a means to keep 'the Germans down', which is how NATO's first Secretary General Hastings Ismay (cited in NATO n. y.) once explained one of the Atlantic Alliance's main purposes and which has a quite negative connotation. Rather, inclusion through European integration is an answer to the German Question which is in the Germans' direct national interest. In this sense, integration does not only constrain them *as Germans* but also mobilises them *as Europeans*.

Similar beliefs regarding integration were also held by the senior partner of the government coalition. Despite his statement that Germany had become a great power again which should now conduct a foreign policy adapted to this status, Chancellor Schröder also stressed in his first government policy statement that 'German foreign policy is and will remain peace policy' and that '[w]e will remain reliable partners in Europe and the world' (Schröder 1998, author's translation). In another speech a few months later, he explained why being a 'reliable partner' was particularly essential for Germany: 'The basic orientations of our foreign policy will remain unchanged. We know: *Germany's economic and political success is inextricably*

linked to the integration into the western community of states, into the European Union and into NATO' (Schröder 1999b, author's translation, emphasis mine). Apparently, Germany would stick to its two principles of promoting peace and multilateralism as it was in the country's direct interest.

Multilateral action seemed even more important in light of the fact that the end of the Cold War had not brought about peace but rather war back to Europe and that Germany was expected to contribute its new, increased fair share. Commenting on the need to take on more responsibility, Schröder put emphasis not only on Germany's adherence to its responsibilities within NATO. He also stressed the country's ambition to develop the instruments of European foreign policy in order to provide Europe with the power to act when necessary (Schröder 1998). Several German interview partners, both senior officials and politicians, explained that a common diplomatic service would have provided Germany with such a multilateral framework to take on this responsibility for peace (Interviews 3, 4, 9, 13, 21), thereby combining both German foreign policy principles. Germany, which had internalised more than any other country the maxim: 'Never go it alone again', as one interviewee put it, appreciated the responsibility of the EU, as a multilateral framework, for peace, which became evident in the Convention. This orientation of the EU would wrap up the German triad of *never again war*, *never again Auschwitz*, and *never again unilaterally* (Interview 21), in short: peace and multilateralism.

Therefore, it is probably not a coincidence that it was Germany which had both perceived the shortcomings of the EU's foreign policy and was also willing to make concessions to compensate for them. The senior diplomat Matussek, who also served as head of one of the political departments in the Auswärtiges Amt, explained that Germany had always realised that a gap existed in CFSP and that the EU was not really able to speak as a whole. On the other hand, he explained, it comes much more naturally to Germany to make concessions because of its historical background (Interview 5). Or, as a non-German EU official put it in a more ra-

tionalistic way, Germany 'never wanted to lead on its own in foreign policy, so CFSP was the right vehicle' (Interview 19).

The *second argument* of this chapter is that, while these German principles had been reinforced through the Balkan crises, the Yugoslav Wars also played a more direct role in leading Germany to propose a common diplomatic service into practice. This reflects the assumption that, although the CFSP had already been formally established in Maastricht, the 'Balkans is the birthplace of EU foreign policy', as the EEAS's first head Catherine Ashton (2010) put it. Similarly, Fischer underlined in 2000 that 'it was not least the war in Kosovo that prompted the European states to take further steps to strengthen their joint capacity for action on foreign policy' (Fischer 2000a: 4). More precisely, several interview partners, both German and non-German officials, not least Fischer himself, argued that especially *Germany's* support for a reform of the CFSP and its proposal in the European Convention 2002/2003 to introduce a common diplomatic service must be seen in light of the Balkan experience (Interviews 1, 12, 17, 21). That is mainly because of two reasons.

First, the Yugoslav Wars had shown the EU's inability to react to a major crisis at its doorsteps. This posed challenges especially to Germany's multilateral and peace-promoting identity and, thereby, to its national interests of security and prosperity. Its proposals for common diplomatic structures must therefore also be seen against the background of the bitter experience of the Balkan Wars and the lack of unity in this question, as a German EEAS official explained (Interview 12). In addition to the EU's disunity, the experience of the incapacity of the United Nations Security Council to act was a crucial experience, especially for Fischer and his party. The Council principally acknowledged human rights violations in the Balkans but failed to pass a resolution for an intervention. An interviewed advisor of the German delegation to the European Convention argued that Fischer struggled very long whether to take part in NATO's air strikes against Milošević without a clear mandate of the UN. While the Greens had always seen the UN as the appropriate framework for foreign missions and preferred the civilian orientation of the UN and

the EU over NATO's military approach, a paralysis of the Security Council became evident in the Kosovo crisis. The Greens had to admit that there was no plan for such a situation (Interview 21). This renewed the feeling on the German side that the EU was an economic power and also well positioned in foreign aid, but it was lacking the geostrategic, diplomatic element (Interview 21). Obviously, Germany, or Fischer, wanted to act multilaterally but could not.

Second, a common diplomatic service was not merely seen as a way to be prepared if Europe should again be confronted with such a crisis. Rather, it was also regarded as a decisive tool for a long-term solution to this specific Balkan crisis. This was explained by Fischer:

When I took office in autumn of 1998, I was confronted with the Kosovo war – its beginning stages and the war itself. And shockingly, I had to learn that there was no real plan – let alone a political plan – as to what to do after the end of the war. For me, the western Allies in Germany in 1945 had always been an example: to have a plan which promises something. And in this case, it was participation in a common Europe. Because it was evident: integration could not coexist with a militant nationalism *à la* Milošević. So, we developed a plan, together with our partners but initiated by Germany, which aimed to offer a membership perspective to those countries in the long-run. [...] And from this experience resulted the necessity of creating the conditions for the EU to act. [...] *And in this context the question of the CFSP and the corresponding institutional infrastructure with an external service arose.* [...] No nation could make such a promise on its own. This was only possible through the EU. (Interview 1, author's translation, emphasis mine)

Hence, promoting and supporting peace in a multilateral way was also the driver for a European approach to the Balkan crises. In fact, this statement shows that integration was seen as the long-term solution to the Balkan crisis in a twofold way. On the one hand, common diplomatic institutions of integrated Western Europe would be the right instruments to solve the crisis insofar as it enabled the EU to act in that region in the future. On the other hand, integration of the target region itself into this integrated Western Europe would be a policy to be conducted by those new diplomatic structures. Given that Fischer regarded the offer of membership in an integrated Europe as 'a decisive approach of a policy of peace' (Fischer 2005: 2), it is

evident how much this would have meant the transfer of what was seen as the German foreign policy approach to the European level.

However, Fischer clearly stressed that European institutions were not seen as a means to circumvent national impediments or to amplify German geopolitics on a European level. If anything, it was to be seen as geopolitics in a European, not a German, framework insofar as Europe had to manage the integration of this crisis region, which required a common external service as a decisive instrument of a common foreign and security policy (Interview 1). Hence, while Fischer rejected the idea of a common diplomatic service as a means of *German* geopolitics, it is evident that Germany was and is interested in *the EU's geostrategic potential* (Interview 21). Another interview partner put this idea in a more rationalistic way by stating that nowadays the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), jointly conducted by the EEAS and the Commission, is one of the policy areas which is important for Germany in the context of the EEAS 'as it gives a cover to a German *Alleingang* [sic; solo effort]' (Interview 19). Although this remark may sound cynical insofar as it implies that multilateralism serves as an excuse for unilateral pursuit of interests, it reflects the idea that integration is, from a German point of view, a rational answer to the German Question also in the area of foreign policy.

Moving on to consider the *third and final theme* of this chapter, it is important to note that Germany was very much in favour of a common diplomatic service because of the waning influence of the traditional European nation state. Even though it is the biggest country in Europe in terms of population size, this development also made Germany feel its limited ability to safeguard its interest on its own. This view is supported by interview partners of different backgrounds which were consulted on this period (Interviews 2, 3, 19, 21, 23). This narrative is, of course, not new. In the post-World War II world, two superpowers dominated international politics. Paris, Rome – and later London – had lost much of their influence and Berlin was even divided politically and geographically between the two blocs. Hence, an advance in foreign policy through EPC was very much driven by the attempt to put

Europe's weight in the global balance (Cameron 2012: 29–30). The development of EPC into CFSP must similarly be seen both as a means to *include* the foreign affairs of a unified Germany in an enforced European foreign policy framework and, at the same time, as a way to enable Europe 'to punch its weight in the world' (Cameron 2012: 34). Once the discussion on a common diplomatic service had been kicked off, Germany seized on this narrative.

A statement by Rolf Mützenich, vice chairman for foreign affairs of the parliamentary group of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), reflects the close link between this narrative and the motives illuminated above. According to him, the SPD's support for a common diplomatic service was driven by the desire to take on more responsibility: 'Taking on responsibility as a nation, as Germany, but integrated in European cooperation'. This was seen as the appropriate approach 'because we hold the belief that, *first*, this is the appropriate step in light of Europe's historical experience, especially in light of Germany's responsibility which led to the wars. And, *second*, because we even then took the view that Germany [...] can make itself felt within Europe and within Europe's environment but that, in the end, the enforcement of interests [...] can only take place in community, an institutionalised community' (Interview 4).

In a speech to the heads of Germany's diplomatic missions in 2000, Chancellor Schröder also pointed out how closely linked the peace narrative, the need to take on more responsibility, and the necessity to speak with one European voice in the world were in his eyes: 'Maintaining peace and stability outside of Europe is just as much in our fundamental interest as is the peaceful development of our own continent.' If Germany would stand on the sidelines when ethnic cleansing was committed elsewhere, 'we would, in the end, also abet decivilisation and brutalisation over here'. However, since there is no chance that the European countries will be able to persist as isolated nation states in the age of globalisation, he wanted the *Auswärtiges Amt* to reflect with its partners about how new European 'organisational structures' in foreign policy might be realisable (Schröder 2000: 7, 10, author's

translation). In this context, it is also worth noting that his colleague Fischer was one of the most prominent fathers of the term *Friedensmacht EU* (EU as a force for peace), a counter-concept to the French *Europe puissance*, which focuses more on the security and defence dimension. *Friedensmacht EU* was in the following European electoral campaigns advanced by Schröder's SPD and also adapted as a characterisation of the EU by many non-German European politicians (Ehrhart 2011: 219; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet and Rüger 2015: 245–246).

After the European Convention and during the ratification period of the Constitutional Treaty, Fischer made very clear that the support for a common external service as a common European voice was in Germany's own interest in a globalised world: 'It is of vital importance that the Europeans realise at the beginning of the 21st century that we have to grow together. If Europe remained divided, we would have to pay a high price. This is why we have to use this chance, also and above all in our own interest. It is particularly important for us that a new dimension opens up, namely Europe's common external service' (Fischer 2004: 2, author's translation; see also Fischer 2003a: 8). In the interview, Fischer elaborated on the origins of his hope and expectation that common diplomatic structures might be useful and effective. He stressed that it was one of his best experiences to witness how the three diplomatic services of France, the UK, and Germany, especially on the level of the senior officials, worked together in the Iran negotiations on the country's nuclear programme in 2003/2004 and acted like *one* single foreign service. This proved that if these three countries work together, Europe can really achieve something (on the global stage). Therefore, it also influenced the idea of a common European diplomatic service (Interview 1).

Policy advisor Ronja Kempin, who advised the Auswärtiges Amt (2014) and worked as a research fellow at the Bundestag and the party executive of the SPD (1999–2000) also stressed the deeply-rooted belief of Germany that one could only survive together amongst new emerging powers, such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries. According to her, the shared conviction there-

fore was that Europe will have sufficient leverage in the future to specify the rules of international relations, about which these countries have quite different ideas, only if it speaks with one voice (Interview 23). This statement is remarkable in two ways. *First*, common European foreign policy institutions are seen as a way to take a better stand for Germany's conception of how international relations should work, that is, as explained before, in a multilateral, cooperative, and peaceful way. Again, it is important to keep in mind that Germany believes in these principles precisely because they are in the country's material interest. *Second*, the framework in which Germany wanted to do that is, in itself, multilateral. Similar to the idea to create a common diplomatic service as a twofold solution to the Balkan crises, a European foreign service was regarded both as a further step for European integration and as a transmission belt to spread the German idea of how foreign policy and international politics should work. All in all, Germany's principles of multilateralism, integration, and the promotion of peace, which had been a necessity in light of the historical experience, developed into interests within Europe – and should now also be safeguarded on a global scale.

The attitude of the German delegation to the European Convention was driven by a similar consideration. An interviewed advisor of the German delegation explained that they held the belief that Germany's interests were and would be, especially from a point of view of *'Realpolitik'*, better served in the context of the integration process. Germany, with its orientation towards European cooperation in particular, and multilateral approaches in general, would thus be much better positioned in the globalised 21st century than other countries, which tend to go back to *'Kleinstaaterei'* (Interview 21). Interestingly enough, it is the negatively connoted term from German history itself which is used to describe and criticise current tendencies of renationalisation.

As much as Germany's historical state of a *Flickenteppich* is seen as a deterring example of a political system on the European continent, Germany's modern internal set-up, intended to overcome said particularism, is perceived as one of the

reasons why Germany supported common diplomatic structures in a globalised world. Cesare Onestini, former deputy head of the EU's delegation to India, had the impression that Germany's proposal for, and strong support of, a common diplomatic service 'is in line with the German approach to the EU, especially in the Convention timeframe. The EU was seen as a new kind of layer in the federal approach that Germany has to policy making. And in the German system, foreign relations belong to the upper levels' (Interview 17). This idea is reflected by a remark by a German EEAS official. According to him, some member states, which are less keen on federal structures on the European level, were surprised by how supportive Germany was of common foreign policy structures during the convention period in 2002/2003 (Interview 11). Obviously, Germany had internalised the idea that it is much better off as part of a greater entity.

In light of the previous discussion of the avoidance of *Sonderwege* through integration, a remark by the interviewed former chairman of the Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee, Ruprecht Polenz, member of the Christian Democratic Union in Germany (CDU), should be noted in this context of a particular German approach, characterised by Germany's historical and geopolitical situation. In his eyes, the fact that the European countries are all democracies, and therefore have a fair convergence in terms of values, should enable them to formulate a common foreign policy through a constant coordination in a common external service. This is, he argued, necessary because even the largest European countries would only have limited weight in an emerging multipolar world (Interview 2). There is actually no room for a *Sonderweg*. It is not logical on the European level and would be negligent on the global stage. Taken together, these four previous references show that the narrative had completely changed: Only the support and promotion of integrated structures, thereby rejecting *Kleinstaaterei* and a deviating path of democratisation, would enable Germany to pursue its interests in a globalised, multipolar world. Interestingly, one of the interlocutors mentioned that the deeply-rooted belief that national interests are best served in a European context might actually be a German '*Sonderweg*' in

itself insofar as Germany has internalised this reflex more than any other country (Interview 21).

Notwithstanding the aforementioned German interest to take on more responsibility and promote peace within and beyond Europe, it is important to note that the interests Germany wanted to safeguard go well beyond these more general interests in international politics that correspond to Germany's foreign policy approach. Matussek, who also served as German ambassador to India, the United Kingdom (UK), and to the UN, argued that the driver of Germany's support for a reform of CFSP in the early 2000s was the idea that if the Europeans want to speak with one voice, someone is needed who can implement that operationally. While the peace narrative and the economic narrative had been the main drivers of European integration before, the narrative of globalisation was, in his eyes, more decisive when it came to European foreign policy. Speaking with one voice is, in a globalised world with transnational threats, a way to face challenges, in areas such as cyberspace, finance, or terrorism. Germany does not see the EU as an instrument in a functional way, but it therefore thinks that, while it would also be strong on its own, it can be more influential through the EU (Interview 5).

It is also evident that Germany, and not only smaller member states, would have gained infrastructurally from a common global network of European embassies as part of a European diplomatic service. In 2000, Fischer himself criticised that by closing down 20 embassies and consulates, the German diplomatic network had been reduced to the 1989 level (Fischer 2000b: 13). As indicated above, Pleuger's working document in the European Convention suggested that, as part of a common diplomatic service, 'the Commission delegations should be transformed into EU delegations and merged with the branches abroad of the Council Secretariat' (Pleuger 2002: 4). The delegate of the Bundestag Jürgen Meyer (2002: 1157) and a German delegate of the European Parliament, Klaus Hänsch (2002: 4), were more precise and stressed that they should become 'EU embassies'. While the EU would have fewer embassies than Germany had at that time (the Commission had 110 and

Germany 117, excluding the ten applicants which would join the EU in due course), it would have been represented on ambassadorial level in 26 third countries where Germany did not have an embassy, especially in Africa and Asia (La Convention Européenne 2002: 14–21).

This is particularly important as the German Foreign Minister Fischer repeatedly referred to the increasing importance of these regions for Germany. For example, Fischer emphasised the need of Germany's participation and influence in a preventive, rather than military, 'peace policy' in Africa and Asia in form of a 'multilateral policy of responsibility' (Fischer 2001: 7, author's translation). When giving a speech on the Bundeswehr's participation in the EU's mission in Congo, itself a multilateral foreign policy of the EU, he underlined that the situation in Africa was in Germany's direct interest and explained: 'If [...] our neighbour continent would export this terrible instability, which is prevailing there, the Europeans' security interest in the 21st is directly affected' (Fischer 2003b: 2, author's translation). Finally, in 2004, he underlined that the challenges in Africa would 'reinforce the European dimension of German foreign policy' (Fischer 2004: 5, author's translation). Therefore, the argument does not hold true that it would have been, and nowadays are, only the smaller countries which benefit from the transformation of the Commission's representations into embassies with broader competences.

Concluding this chapter, it is significant to acknowledge how deeply involved and committed the German delegation, especially Joschka Fischer, was in the Convention's working group on external action. This reflects the importance Germany ascribed to an institutional reform of CFSP. In the interview, Fischer himself stressed how proactive and pushing Germany was in the context of the reform of the CFSP and that there was a broad agreement between the political parties in this area (Interview 1). More precisely, the interviewed advisor of the German delegation explained how Fischer literally walked through the corridors and tried to personally convince other people of the creation of a common diplomatic service and a European foreign minister. Fischer himself made several appointments with one of

the delegates of the Italian parliament, Lamberto Dini, who at some point chaired the group of national parliamentary delegates to the European Convention, in order to win the national parliaments over to his side (Interview 21).

This remarkable commitment is also reflected by the fact that Fischer was one of the first foreign ministers who showed up at the Convention in person; the French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin only joined the group after Fischer had indicated his willingness to attend the Convention meetings regularly (Interview 21). The German proposal for a reform of the CFSP and the creation of a foreign minister, as well as a common diplomatic service mentioned above (Pleuger 2002) would soon be followed by a joint document on the future institutional structure of the EU by Fischer and de Villepin (2003). This piece also included the idea of a double-hatted European foreign minister and a common diplomatic service. In line with the general idea of the Franco-German tandem as the engine of European integration in general, and foreign policy integration during the European Convention in particular (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet and Rüger 2015: 100), the former Irish Tánaiste and Foreign Minister Eamon Gilmore stressed that Germany proposed and supported the creation of a common diplomatic service in 2002/2003 because of the shared objective with the French to create a stronger European voice (Interview 16).

2 A new Chance: Germany's Interest in the EEAS from 2005 to 2010

The expectation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy reform was embedded in the constitutional negotiations. And when the constitution failed, a bulk of the framework disappeared. This was repeated in the Lisbon Treaty, but the spirit was gone. [...] In one key respect, Lisbon is much less than the Constitutional Treaty – namely the spirit, the immaterial part, the enthusiasm, the hope, which was linked to pushing Europe forth. This does not exist in Lisbon anymore. (Joschka Fischer, Interview 1, author's translation)

On 1 June 2005, the French voted *non* to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. This not only meant the failure of a treaty characterised by a European

'spirit', as Fischer put it, but also brought the institutional reform of CFSP to a temporary end. The symbols, such as the flag, the European hymn, and most state-like semantics, not least the term *constitution* itself, of this European spirit were removed. However, the debate in the member states had never revolved around the constitution's core. In fact, these symbols reflecting the European spirit constituted the main differences between the two treaties (Weidenfeld 2011: 39). Especially in Germany, there was a willingness to retain the substance of the Constitutional Treaty. In May 2007, Fischer's party Alliance 90/The Greens asked the Bundestag to call on the federal government, which presided the Council and the European Council during the first six months of that year, to initiate negotiations on a new treaty, which should maintain the substance of the Constitutional Treaty. The transformation of the High Representative into a European foreign minister, as well as the establishment of the EEAS were among the priorities mentioned in the document (Deutscher Bundestag 2007a: 4).

While Fischer's party had been in opposition since the 2005 elections, a 2007 Bundestag motion by the new government's grand coalition between the CDU, the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU), and the SPD, the latter now being the junior partner, also emphasised that the main aim of Germany's presidency in the two Councils had been the 'revitalisation' of the European constitutional process (Deutscher Bundestag 2007b: 1, author's translation). Furthermore, members of all governing parties, such as the head and deputy head of the Committee on the Affairs of the European Union of the Bundestag, Gunther Krichbaum (CDU) and Kurt Bodewig (SPD), respectively, as well as the head of the Working Group on Foreign Affairs of the regional faction of the CSU, Thomas Silberhorn, emphasised that it would be important to preserve the substance of the failed Constitutional Treaty in a new agreement (Deutscher Bundestag 2007c: 12206, 12213, 12216).

At the European Council meeting in June 2007, the new German Chancellor Angela Merkel achieved agreement on a mandate for a new Intergovernmental Conference as the German government's final major act of its presidency. Shortly after-

wards, she described a reform of the role of the High Representative and the creation of a European diplomatic service through a new treaty, which would ‘maintain the substance of the Constitutional Treaty’, as a ‘political quantum leap for Europe’ (Merkel 2007: 2–3, author’s translation). Later, she depicted the EEAS as ‘one of the most important innovations of the treaty’ (Merkel 2009a: 2, author’s translation). Accordingly, both the former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and the new head of the Bundestag’s Foreign Affairs Committee Ruprecht Polenz (CDU) confirmed that policy regarding the creation of the EEAS was maintained with the change of government in 2005 (Interviews 1, 2).

In line with the removal of any state-like symbols for the EU, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs was eventually renamed High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in the Lisbon Treaty signed in 2007 – a term almost identical to the previously used expression High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. Furthermore, the new treaty retained the tasks, functions and set-up of this new office, as well as those of the European External Action Service, which even kept its name (TEU 2016: 27, 221). The High Representative would become a full member and one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Commission, as well as the chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Council (TEU 2016: Art. 18, 27). While Germany had originally refrained from proposing this full merger due to supposed reservations of other member states and, instead, suggested to confer the two roles to one person and keep their substructures apart (Pleuger 2002: 2–3), this meant the realisation of Germany’s original idea. The EEAS’s staff would, as envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty, still be composed of personnel from the two institutions, as well as the member states while constituting a separate institution *sui generis* in-between the Commission and the Council (TEU 2016: Art. 27).

All in all, the German proposal had survived the constitutional crisis in Europe because of the country’s commitment. But would Germany’s arguments in support of the EEAS also shift after the European spirit of the Constitutional Treaty disappeared? The previous chapter has shown how the pursuit of peace in and

through Western European integration was extended to the whole of Europe, especially the Balkans, and also to the global level – not least because this was in the country's interest. In fact, German actors continued their rhetoric of the importance of European integration, multilateralism in general, and peace (policy) for Germany. Hence, this chapter will, *first*, show how exactly the multilateral frameworks of the EU and the EEAS were seen as a means to promote peace within and, above all, beyond Europe's border and to take on more responsibility. In particular, balancing interests in the EU was regarded as an essential first step to enable Europe to speak with one voice. In conceptual terms, Germany wanted Europe's foreign policy to adopt the German approach of peace and multilateralism insofar as it was highly committed to making the common diplomatic service an instrument of a *civilian power* on the global stage.

Second, and similar to the Balkan crises, the negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme must be seen as a particular series of events which, from a German point of view, called for a common diplomatic service. The aggregated weight the Europeans put in the balance by including the then High Representative Javier Solana and its Policy Unit in the negotiations illustrated how common diplomatic structures can help to speak with one voice and get significant results. Finally, once the Lisbon Treaty had been ratified and the establishment of the EEAS ensured, it became evident that, in the eyes of German decision-makers, the country should safeguard its interests in the construction of the service. I will, therefore, *third* present how Germany did not only push for appropriate staff representation in the new European diplomatic structures but also for an accentuated role of the German language in the EEAS, and how this is linked to Germany's motives for supporting the diplomatic service as such.

Whereas Fischer bemoans the loss of the European spirit of the Convention, the *first argument* of this chapter is that the government's perception of, and action within, Europe was still driven by the particular German spirit, that is its multilateral and peace-oriented approach, and that the EEAS was seen as a means to pro-

mote Germany's foreign policy principles. Already Merkel's first government policy statement in 2005 showed continuity in the government's attitude inasmuch as 'Germany's foreign and European policy is based on values and it is interest-driven politics. A policy which is in Germany's interest relies on alliances and cooperation with our partners' (cited in Deutscher Bundestag 2005: 88, author's translation). Apparently, Merkel's conviction was in line with the previous government's belief in the close link between values and the country's national interests. In a 2009 speech, which was part of the Humboldt speeches that had been institutionalised after Fischer's widely received talk in 2000, Merkel highlighted the first and foremost principle driving her European policy again: 'The advocacy of German interests in Europe and an eye for the whole. These are two sides of the same coin' (Merkel 2009b, author's translation).

Using Helmut Kohl's metaphor for German reunification in the context of European integration, Merkel, probably not by chance and similar to Fischer, reminded the audience of a specific and significant example of the extent to which multilateralism and integration had been in Germany's national interest. She rejected the assumption that Germany was only a *Zahlmeister* (paymaster) and broker who did not represent its own interests in Europe and, furthermore, underlined that Germany does indeed defend interests in Europe: 'But we do not do it hell-bent on getting our way – we are always conscious of the whole. A role in Europe, which takes into account many different interests and combines them as a German position, results from our geographical central location [*Mittellage*], our economic power and our historical experiences alone'. This balancing of interests is, in her eyes, the European side of the aforementioned metaphorical coin (Merkel 2009b, author's translation). Apparently, by referring to Germany's historical and geopolitical situation, Merkel used the same narrative that not least Fischer had already presented ten years earlier: European integration is the answer to the German Question and, therefore, in the country's national interest (the German side of the coin) as it allows for a balancing of Germany's interests and those of other nations.

In fact, the EEAS was seen as a means to achieve this balancing of interests in foreign policy in order to enable the EU to speak with one voice within and outside of Europe. The new conservative-liberal government elected in 2009 underscored in its coalition agreement that Germany's action would not be characterised by an attempt to bluntly dominate European foreign policy. Rather, the government would 'guarantee that respecting the interests of smaller and medium-sized EU member states remains a signature feature of German European policy'. This unity, as the narrative goes, is the only way to 'successfully represent our values and interests in the world', such as peace, freedom, and prosperity. Therefore, they argue, the establishment of the European External Action Service is essential (CDU, CSU and FDP 2009: 114, 117–118, author's translation).

Ruprecht Polenz, at that time chairman of the Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee, also articulated the importance for a big member state like Germany to acknowledge and to integrate the perspective of other members as politics is not a 'zero-sum game' but must produce 'win-win situations' (Interview 2). In the same vein, Thomas Matussek, a diplomat rather than a politician, explained that Germany's interests are, of course, not always in line with all other member states' interests. However, Germany wanted coordination and a balancing of interests among EU members because of two reasons. On the one hand, this is a learning experience in light of the peace and economic narrative. On an operative level, however, it is also seen as necessary insofar as Germany is confronted with globalisation (Interview 5).

This need to speak with one voice was, in turn, emphasised with a view to the promotion of peace and multilateralism both within and beyond Europe. Commenting on the upcoming creation of the EEAS, Foreign Minister Westerwelle stressed that Germany could enter the global stage with authority only if Europe speaks with one voice. For exactly this reason, it would be necessary to draw the lessons from history and both stand up for and promote the European model of cooperation, which had replaced the model of confrontation (Westerwelle 2010a: 1–2).

His predecessor until 2009 Steinmeier stressed that the EU means common action for peace, development and multilateralism *also on a global scale*: ‘European Union means [...] a common European foreign policy, common action for peace and development in the whole world. Only as a European Union are we an actor that is taken seriously on the international stage’ (Steinmeier 2007a: 3, author’s translation).

By literally referring to Germany’s constitutionally enshrined ‘determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe’ (Basic Law 2014: Preamble) and, therefore, its constitutionally anchored membership in the EU as a means ‘to bring about and secure a lasting peace in Europe and among the nations of the world’ (Basic Law 2014: Art. 24(2)), Merkel stressed that ‘Germany has always understood European integration as part of its *raison d’état*’ (Merkel 2009b, author’s translation). However, she also emphasised that action to pursue this goal beyond Europe’s border would be necessary. In her view, it is important to expand the scope of the peace mandate of the EU, originally an internal mandate for peace *in* Europe, to a more external peace mandate. For that reason, Europe has to take on responsibility on a global scale through *CFSP* (Merkel 2009b). Merkel repeatedly put emphasis on the idea that – besides a High Representative which already existed – the establishment of a European External Action Service would be crucial in order to have a common voice and advocate for a world of peace, freedom, and security (Merkel 2008: 5–7, 2009a: 2). All in all, the new government perceived the EEAS as a potentially decisive tool to make Europe speak with one voice in order to achieve peace, security and development (Deutscher Bundestag 2010a). The two main debates on the EEAS in the Bundestag in April and June 2010 make clear that this was also the main argument of the SPD and the Greens (both in opposition now) for a common diplomatic service (Deutscher Bundestag 2010b, c).

In light of this idea, it is important to consider that Germany had a very clear idea of what these means to extend the scope of the peace mandate should look like and actually supported the transfer of its own approach in foreign policy to the EU as an actor in foreign affairs. Although the concept of *civilian power* was applied to

Europe when it was first used by François Duchêne (1972, 1973), it only made its career in International Relations when Hanns Maull (1990, 1992) used it to describe Germany (and Japan). A *Zivilmacht* (civilian power) is characterised by an inclination for cooperation, a preference for non-military means and the use of armed forces only as an *ultima ratio*, and supranational structures (Maull 1992: 92). Beyond discussion on the analytical value of Maull's concept, it is, as was already indicated in the previous chapter, important what actors perceive and what they internalise as a country's identity and interests. That said, it should be noted that the aforementioned statements of politicians of the ruling parties refer to the ideas of Maull's concept implicitly.

Notwithstanding this, German politicians also used this term explicitly to describe what *European* foreign policy should be like. For example, during Germany's presidency in the Councils, Steinmeier described the EU as a 'civilian power with teeth'. While the EU's 'teeth' acknowledges the idea that a civilian power does not completely reject military means but sees them as an *ultima ratio*, Steinmeier stressed that 'they alone cannot solve the upcoming challenges'. During Germany's presidency, the systematic development of civilian capabilities would therefore remain a priority. This was seen as the only fitting approach for the EU to export security and to take on more responsibility beyond Europe's borders in order to foster the '[t]he success story of Europe [which] rests on three pillars: peace, stability and prosperity' (Steinmeier 2007b: 39, author's translation). Apparently, a German approach was seen as necessary in order to continue the success story of Europe.

While Die Linke accused the government of a militarisation of European foreign policy through the affiliation of the crisis prevention and military structures of the EU to the EEAS (Deutscher Bundestag 2010b: 3621, c: 4749, d: 2), all other parties consensually supported this integration of different capabilities as the EU should be a civilian power. In a motion for a mandate for the government to negotiate the set-up of the EEAS in 2010, the coalition parties CDU/CSU and FDP emphasised the need

that the structures within the framework of crisis management and CSDP [Common Security and Defence Policy] are reasonably integrated into the EEAS. [...] Thus a decoupling or transition to independence of the military structures of the foreign and security policy of the EU is to be avoided. It is essential that, in line with *a comprehensive approach of security*, the EU as a *civilian power* brings its civilian and military crisis management instruments to bear and that it is enabled to identify crises when they are emerging and deal with them in accordance with *comprehensive crisis and conflict prevention*. (Deutscher Bundestag 2010e: 3, author's translation, emphasis mine)

This perception of a need to prevent the EU's military structures from becoming dominant, which reflects Germany's own tradition since World War II, was widely shared by the opposition. The Greens's speaker, Manuel Sarrazin, emphasised in the Bundestag debate on the new diplomatic service that an integration of the military structures into the EEAS is crucial in order to prevent them from becoming autonomous actors. Rather, the EU has to be a 'Zivilmacht' (Deutscher Bundestag 2010c: 4749–4750). According to the Greens, crisis prevention and civil conflict management must be the priority because the EU is a 'Zivilmacht', which is why the EEAS has to strengthen the EU's civilian capabilities (Deutscher Bundestag 2010f: 3).

In the interview, the former spokesman for foreign affairs of the SPD parliamentary group Rolf Mützenich explained that the SPD supported the integration of the EU's crisis prevention and military structures into the EEAS because 'we also try to achieve a better linkage in this area on the national level' (Interview 4), which clearly shows that the national approach is seen as a blueprint. Frithjof Schmidt agrees that the creation of the EEAS was also a chance to bring in the German conception of foreign policy and civilian power: 'In the development of such structures, there is, of course, a political debate on the concepts and ideas to be realised. And there are, as explained before, extremely different national cultures. And this [the EEAS] is, of course, an opportunity to promote a concept of conflict prevention in European politics that may be very different from a French or English understanding of foreign policy as a policy of power projection' (Interview 3).

As is evident from Schmidt's remark, the EEAS provided an opportunity to 'upload' a national culture which was not only particularly German but also dif-

ferred very much from that of others, such as France and Britain. The degree to which the French conception of foreign and security policy may be different is evident from the aforementioned contrasting concepts of *Friedensmacht Europa* and *Europe puissance*. While Germany believes that its interests in the area of foreign policy are closely linked to the EU, as one of the interviewees explained, the French would aim to influence the EU as the *grande nation* (great nation) (Interview 15).

The diverging British approach, on the other hand, is evident from its current perception of the EEAS. Several interlocutors stressed that Germany's approach to the EEAS has been less functional than that of the UK. Britain would often ask which capabilities that they do not have the service can offer in order to safeguard or amplify its national interests (Interviews 6, 15, 22). The EEAS's purpose as an instrument to enforce national interests was, in fact, stressed several times by the former British Minister of State for Europe David Lidington himself (Parliament of the United Kingdom 2012, 2013). In contrast, the usefulness of Germany's particular pro-integrationist approach is reflected by a remark by Ruprecht Polenz. Responding to the differences between the approaches of the UK and Germany to the EEAS, he said: 'Well, the British have never really internalised the idea of thinking beyond the box of the nation state. And this is also one of the reasons why they now bid goodbye to the EU. The British still think in past categories of sovereignty and nationhood. *But this is not the way of thinking with which we can make progress in Europe*' (Interview 2, author's translation, emphasis mine). This positive assessment of the German approach is reflected by a remark by the former German Foreign Minister Fischer. According to him, this approach, stemming from Germany's geopolitical location and its past, must not necessarily be seen as a disadvantage:

Our past is not a millstone around our neck [*Klotz am Bein*] – it is a reality. The reality is different for Great Britain, which still openly negotiates in the context of national interests. This is not really an option for Germany. [...] And our geopolitical location is also different. And this does not necessarily have to be a disadvantage. [...] We have a different geopolitical location in the centre of Europe and another history – and a different mentality conditioned by this history. (Interview 1)

In addition to this more general feeling that common diplomatic structures are needed for a common European voice, the second argument of this chapter is that the recent experience of negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme played a crucial role in perceiving common diplomatic structures as a significant asset to put Europe's weight in the balance. Similar to the Kosovo crisis, it raised awareness for the usefulness of common diplomatic structures in specific situations.

As a result of the negotiations between Iran and the EU in combination with Germany, France, and Britain, an agreement was achieved in November 2004 which included the suspension of Iran's uranium conversion. As I indicated in the previous chapter, Fischer's support for the EEAS was driven by this close cooperation of the diplomatic services of France, the UK, and Germany in 2003/2004. After Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's election victory in July 2005, however, Iran ignored a new proposal of the EU and restarted conversion from August 2005. Directly after assuming office in 2005, Steinmeier stressed that a settlement of this renewed dispute with Iran on its nuclear programme was 'the most urgent' foreign policy issue for Germany (Deutscher Bundestag 2005: 123, author's translation).

In this new context, the inclusion of the High Representative Javier Solana and his Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, commonly referred to as Policy Unit, from 2004 was regarded as another, second instance in the Iran context of how common diplomatic structures could successfully provide the European countries with the ability to achieve goals they could not reach on their own. Therefore, it is worth considering the Policy Unit, which the former Commission official for external relations Fraser Cameron describes as 'Solana's eyes and ears' (Cameron 2012: 54), in more detail. In fact, it consisted of both a delegate of each member state, as well as an official from the Commission and three representatives of the Council Secretariat. Furthermore, it was later almost completely transferred to the EEAS. It can thus be seen as one of the latter's nuclei (Juncos and Pomorska 2015: 374).

Interestingly, the Unit was led by the German diplomat Christoph Heusgen from 1999 to 2005. Right before he left the Unit, he emphasised that foreign policy

can only be successful in collaboration with partners. He made clear that not even the three largest member states had been able to make the Iranians relent. Rather, the inclusion of the EU in these talks was necessary to eventually create a package which would convince Iran in late 2004. Since Heusgen, at that point, believed that the EEAS would not be realisable anymore because of the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, he proposed to at least enlarge the Policy Unit in terms of its staffing (Heusgen 2005: 338–339). Interestingly, Heusgen, likely affected by the pro-European DNA of German diplomats that Matussek supposed as he had served as Matussek's deputy head of the office of the German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel for some time, became Merkel's policy advisor shortly afterwards, when she won the 2005 federal elections. Given that the head of this cell was a German diplomat, that he would become Merkel's advisor in due course, and that he regarded this unit, which he himself called the 'embryo' of a potential EEAS (Heusgen 2005: 338), as the decisive instrument in achieving an agreement with Iran in 2004, it is indeed reasonable to assume that the creation of a fully-fledged EEAS would also be seen as a useful tool by the government for further priorities of Germany – such as a new deal with Iran.

In addition, it is important to note that, right after Heusgen had left Brussels, Helga Schmid – head of Fischer's office until his government was voted out of office in September 2005 – became director of the Policy Unit in January 2006, and remained in that post until the EEAS was founded in 2010. She then became Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs in October 2010 before she was appointed Secretary General of the EEAS in September 2016. This staffing illustrates two important points. *First*, the *nucleus* of the common diplomatic service was led by top German diplomats from its origin until it was transferred to the EEAS. This not only reflects a high level of German interest in common foreign policy bodies but also provided Germany with significant experiences in how common diplomatic structures can lead to success in an area which is very important for Germany. *Second*, even though Schmid was certainly not only responsible for the Iran negotiations but

also other issues, this shows that Germany's approach of initiating something on a member state level (with France and the UK in that case), then passing it on the European level, and giving preference to the European over the national level (Interviews 23) was accompanied by a corresponding transfer of human resources. This is also very well reflected by a remark by Fischer:

And, by the way, the crucial civil servant in this process, the aide-de-camp of the High Representative, if you will, was the only one in the Western group who was present at the Iran negotiations from the first moment to the last, until the success: Helga Schmid. She was present during the first trip to Tehran that we made – along with Jack Straw and Dominique de Villepin, the three foreign ministers – and she stayed until the end as the representative of the High Representative. She was, so to speak, *the institutional memory on the western side*. (Interview 1, author's translation, emphasis mine)

This game that Germany played on two levels in order to achieve its own interest is also illustrated in a remark by Thomas Matussek, Permanent Representative of Germany to the UN from 2006 to 2009, who stressed that, while it was Europe that was visible externally, Germany was still the driving force on the European side within EU3+3 (which consisted of the five permanent members of the Security Council, as well as Germany). For example, he himself drafted three of the Iran resolutions (Interview 5). This positive experience of common European diplomatic efforts has also been emphasised by others. By referring to Solana's participation in the negotiations, Ruprecht Polenz stressed that one could not expect that Europe would rally around a national foreign minister and that, therefore, the presence of the High Representative in the Iran negotiations was important (Interview 2).

Furthermore, the Iran example also concretely shows how common diplomatic structures can provide a framework in which a balance of interests can be achieved in foreign policy. This was, as explained above, seen as crucial by the German government under Merkel in order to compensate for the waning influence of the – then 25 – small nation states that the EU consists of. In fact, the inclusion of Solana and his embryonic diplomatic service in the talks with Iran functioned as a means to appease other member states which had expressed their displeasure about

being left out before. This was articulated by both outside observers and decision-makers (Interviews 4, 23). Fischer himself also described how the Italians wanted to take part in the negotiations, which, in his opinion, would have blown the format and provided the Iranians with a means of escape. The consequence was the inclusion of the High Representative, which he described as the right decision (Interview 1).

In addition to those interests which Germany, as discussed above, wished to be able to pursue *through* common diplomatic structures, the creation of the EEAS itself from 2010 also saw a German attempt to defend its interest *in* the new service right from the beginning. In March 2010, just a few months before the Council would adopt the decision on the EEAS, the German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle emphasised the need to safeguard German interests in the construction of the EEAS: 'Next week, we will talk about the European External Action Service, which has to be built up. You know that there is a lot still to be done *so that German interests are safeguarded in this area* and, above all, it is ensured that we will get a European External Action Service which is good, powerful, and able to act' (Westerwelle 2010b: 3, author's translation, emphasis mine). Therefore, Germany's interest in the set-up of the service is the *third* argument, which will subsequently be discussed.

The *first* of these German interests in the set-up of the EEAS was appropriate representation in terms of human resources. In this regard, it is important to note that there had been a debate on the '*presence allemande*' (German presence) (Interview 7) in international organisations since the turn of the millennium (Interviews 7, 9, 25). In October 2007, only a few days before the heads of state and government would agree on a text for the new Lisbon treaty, the coalition parties CDU/CSU and SPD brought forward a motion titled 'Consequently strengthen the representation of German staff in international organisations in the national interest' (Deutscher Bundestag 2007d, author's translation), which was developed and adopted by all parties, except Die Linke (Deutscher Bundestag 2008a: 15304, 15309). According to

the motion, Germany should be better represented quantitatively and qualitatively through a long-term human resource strategy and German staff in those organisations should be better acquainted with the German foreign policy agenda. In the context of the argument made here, it is important to note that the motion described the EU as the one organisation which ‘plays a paramount role for Germany’ (Deutscher Bundestag 2007d, author’s translation). The fact that this motion was passed by almost all parties shows that there was a fundamental and broad consensus that Germany should actively shape these institutions, not least through an adequate representation in staff, because this helps to safeguard its interests.

In the debate on the motion in February 2008, just a few months after the establishment of the EEAS had been agreed on as part of the Lisbon Treaty, the speaker of the CDU, Holger Haibach, explained more precisely why the German staff representation in international organisations must be improved. He stressed that strong international organisations are in Germany’s national interest because, *first*, Germany is historically obliged to ‘think internationally’, *second*, international organisations are becoming increasingly important in a globalised world and, *third*, these institutions will help Germany to engage in a positive competition with countries as populous as China or India (Deutscher Bundestag 2008a: 15308, author’s translation). Therefore, Germany’s aim to be appropriately represented in international organisations reflects and supports the idea that Germany is, or is regarded to be, much better positioned in the world *precisely because* of its historically inspired attitude to support and to invest in international organisations (Interview 21).

In the same debate, Werner Hoyer (FDP), who would soon become Secretary of State in the Auswärtiges Amt after the 2009 elections, emphasised that it is necessary to reject the Commission’s claim that staff sent from the member states should not be allowed to have managerial authority over EU officials because this would only allow for subordinate tasks for national officials (Deutscher Bundestag 2008a: 15304). In another motion in April 2008, the FDP brought both of these claims regarding the EEAS together as it stressed the need to both avoid the mistakes of the

past in Germany's human resource policy in international institutions and to provide (German) national diplomats in the EEAS with the same rights and obligations as EU officials (Deutscher Bundestag 2008b: 6–7). Furthermore, the CDU/CSU and SPD government stressed several times that it aims at an 'appropriate' representation of Germans in the EEAS, also in higher-ranking positions. They furthermore demanded that (German) national diplomats must have the same status as EU officials and must be represented on all levels both in the headquarters in Brussels, as well as in the delegations abroad (Deutscher Bundestag 2008c: 5, d: 4). Therefore unsurprisingly, the next CDU/CSU and SPD government argued in a similar way (Deutscher Bundestag 2009: 5, 2010g: 8, h: 10–11, i: 5). While one could perceive these as empty words, it is essential to acknowledge that Germany was successful in sending some national officials into high-ranking posts, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

The *second* German interest in the set-up of the common diplomatic service was also articulated by Hoyer who stressed that, in the wake of the establishment of the EEAS, the language regime in (intergovernmental) CSDP, according to which only English and French had so far been used as working languages, had to be adapted to the trilingual regime of the (supranational) Commission, which included German. If this was not done, German would play no role in European foreign policy for decades to come, which 'cannot be in our interest' (Deutscher Bundestag 2008a: 15304, author's translation). The fact that German is the most widely spoken native language in the EU, as well as an important foreign language in Europe, is often put forward as an argument. However, a speech by liberal Michael Link two months later made very clear that the main reason for strengthening the role of German in EU institutions in general is economic in nature: For example, businesses should not be disadvantaged by the fact that many documents are only available in English and French (Deutscher Bundestag 2008e: 16338). As the EEAS would also be concerned with economic matters, for example through the presence of members of the Commission's General-Directorate Trade in the EEAS delegations, it is evident

that the idea that German should play an important role in the EEAS and European foreign policy was not least driven by national economic interests.

This claim to make German an equal working language in the EEAS and to put an end to its 'discrimination' in European foreign policy was repeatedly stressed by the FDP (Deutscher Bundestag 2008f: 8), not least by Hoyer as minister of state (Deutscher Bundestag 2010b: 2256), as well as by the CDU/CSU parliamentary group (Deutscher Bundestag 2010e: 6). The government made clear that this aim to establish German would not only imply the status of German as a working language within the EEAS but also its command as a requirement for applicants, as well as its use in external communication and on the website (Deutscher Bundestag 2010a: 11, g: 10, j: 6). In April 2010, Westerwelle even wrote a personal letter to the EEAS's first head, High Representative Baroness Catherine Ashton, in which he stressed that the recruitment criteria should 'include clear demands for the command of several languages, especially of the German language' (cited in taz 2010, author's translation). Insofar as these initiatives coincided with a competition for the best posts in the wake of the construction of the EEAS, it is evident that the requirement of German would have been a clear advantage for German candidates.

Westerwelle's continuous efforts for an appropriate use of German in the new service had been partly successful. Ashton promised that German, being the most widely spoken native language in Europe, would play a central role in the EEAS in many respects, including communication with citizens and national parliaments, as well as the submission of official documents to other EU institutions in German. However, while knowledge of foreign languages, including German, would become an important requirement for job applicants in general, the command of German per se would only be considered as a prerequisite for new staff 'within the scope of possibilities' (Deutscher Bundestag 2010k: 8, author's translation). Regardless, the German government underlined that it would continue to work towards a change of this current practice according to which only French and English were required for applicants by the EEAS (Deutscher Bundestag 2010l: 4).

3 A new Treaty: Germany's Interest in the EEAS from 2010 to 2017

On 26 July 2010, the Council brought the EEAS into being. As indicated in the introduction, the most significant example of the revolutionary and hybrid character of the service is the composition of its staff, which is unusual even for the *sui generis* nature of the EU: 'When the EEAS has reached its full capacity, staff from Member States [...] should represent at least one third of all EEAS staff at AD level. Likewise, permanent officials of the Union should represent at least 60 % of all EEAS staff at AD level' (Council of the European Union 2010: Art. 6(9)). Administrators (AD) constitute the highest category of officials in the EU; all member state officials sent to the EEAS belong to this category. Contrary to these general provisions, the Council decision did not provide quotas for each member state. Nevertheless, not least Helga Schmid's first role as one of the EEAS's Deputy Secretary Generals shows Germany's interest in filling important posts in the new service.

Against this background, this chapter will show how Germany was successful in using the EEAS as a multilateral, integrationist framework which corresponds to the country's understanding of foreign policy, as well as international politics. *First*, I will elaborate on Germany's representation in the EEAS in terms of staff. According to its plan indicated in the previous chapter, Germany was successful in putting officials in key positions in the EEAS, which is decisive in order to play an important role in European foreign policy. This success has lasted to the present day. *Second*, the chapter will show in how far the EEAS has been helpful for Germany's pursuit of particular national policies and interests. Both Germany's human resource policy and its pursuit of interests in the EEAS are not only in line with the country's multilateral and integrationist approach to foreign policy but are successful precisely because of this particular German approach. *Third and finally*, this chapter will address the issue of clashing interests in European foreign policy, and in

how far the EEAS serves as the instrument for Germany to balance them in its own national interest.

For the *first argument* of this chapter, it is important to note that German officials in the EEAS, interviewed on the whole lifespan of the diplomatic service, stressed that it has been important for Germany to fill key positions (Interviews 12, 13). Interview partners of almost all backgrounds emphasised that the country was successful in doing that (Interviews 7, 10, 17, 22). The aforementioned debate in the Bundestag resulted in a series of reports on Germany's representation in international organisations 'in the national interest' (cf. Deutscher Bundestag 2007d, author's translation). The second of these reports was published shortly after the Council had decided to establish the EEAS and stressed the importance of the roles of Schmid as Deputy Secretary General and of the German diplomat Markus Ederer as the EU's first ambassador to China (Deutscher Bundestag 2010m: 4). One of the interlocutors confidentially described the latter staffing as a good example of Germany getting what they want, while the chairman of the Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee Polenz perceived it as an outstanding post for a German (Interview 2). The main reason why Germany was keen on having Schmid in a top management position was to prevent the whole leadership from becoming British with a French touch (Interview 22).

For the subsequent, more detailed analysis of the German staff representation in the EEAS, it is important to clarify the use of specific terms. The *senior management* includes all managing directors (MDs), directors general (DGs), deputy managing directors (DMDs), and all other staff on *directorial* level. While all DMDs are *directors*, there are more directors than DMDs in total. In contrast, MDs and DGs are *not referred to as directors*. Instead, they constitute a separate higher category within the senior management. The senior management does not include the EEAS's highest-ranking officials, the *top management*, who formed the Corporate Board in the past, consisting of an Executive Secretary General, a Chief Operating Officer, and two Deputy Secretary Generals. The Board was dissolved as such in 2015 but

the number of four top management staff was retained. Despite their organisational affiliation with, and location in, the European Commission, the staff of Mogherini's office is, as is evident from interviewees' elaborations, Germany's reports on its staff representation in international organisations, as well as the High Representative's twofold function, usually taken into account when Germany's representation in key positions in the EEAS is assessed (Interviews 7, 8; Deutscher Bundestag 2015).

During the early days of the EEAS, when its set-up was only 'provisional' (EEAS 2010), the first few posts in the senior management were filled with EU officials, while several other positions remained vacant. However, two of these EU officials were German civil servants from the Commission: Gunnar Wiegand became DMD for *Russia, Eastern Neighbourhood & Western Balkans* and Gerhard Sabathil director of the department *Audit, Inspection & Ex-post control* (Vogel 2010; EEAS 2010). In 2011, Vincent Guérend, a French-German Commission official became MD for *Administration and Finance* (EEAS 2011a) and, later that year, Hansjörg Haber became the first German *national official* in the senior management as director of the Crisis and Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) (EEAS 2011b). According to the third report on Germany's staff representation published two years later, the country now supplied, in addition to Haber, two more staff on directorial level who were both national officials: Roland Schäfer as DMD of the department *Americas*, as well as Stephan Auer as DMD of the department *Global Issues* (Deutscher Bundestag 2012: 6).

The fourth report of the government published in June 2015 (Deutscher Bundestag 2015) was the first after the EEAS had achieved the target of a third of staff from the member states (EEAS 2015: 57) and was published before the EEAS undertook major changes in its inner organisation in July 2015 (EEAS 2016: 8). The report stated that Germany was 'appropriately' represented in the top and senior management in the EEAS headquarters in Brussels, since one of the members of the Corporate Board (Schmid), four – out of 18 – directors, as well as the deputy head of Mogherini's team, Oliver Rentschler, were German (Deutscher Bundestag 2015: 8).

The major part of the EEAS is, since the restructuring in 2015, now made up of six departments concerned with the actual tasks of the EEAS: one for every world region (*Africa, Americas, Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa*) and one called *Human Rights, Global and Multilateral Issues*. Each of them is headed by a MD who is supported by one DMD, except for the department *Europe and Central Asia* with two DMDs. Two Deputy Secretary Generals, one for *Economic and Global Issues* and one for *Political Affairs* – the Political Director – oversee these six departments. Furthermore, a seventh department for *Budget and Administration* exists, which has a DG and two directors (only recently a third one was introduced), comparable to the MD and DMD, respectively, of the other departments. It is under direct control of the Secretary General (EEAS 2017a).

The crisis prevention/response, intelligence and military structures, whose affiliation with the EEAS was supported by most German parties, are organised in different ways. A third Deputy Secretary General is responsible for CSDP and crisis response. He lacks MDs but directly controls four directors who are responsible for the crisis prevention/response, as well as the civilian intelligence structures: the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), the Crisis and Management Planning Directorate (CMPD), the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) and the Directorate for Security Policy and Conflict Prevention (SECPOL). Vice versa, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) is headed by a DG who is directly answerable to the Secretary General. He or she is supported by a deputy director general and, in addition, presides over another five directors. Finally, there is both a director for *General Affairs*, who is directly answerable to the Secretary General, and the *Chair of the PSC*, who is a director, too (EEAS 2017a).

The two first human resources reports published after the EEAS's restructuring show how well Germany was still represented in the senior management structures. According to the EEAS Human Resources Report 2015, there were still four German directors: two diplomats from the Auswärtiges Amt, Roland Schäfer and Stephan Auer, the Brigade General Heinz Krieb as director of the department Con-

cepts and Capabilities within the EUMS, and the Commission official Wiegand as the director/DMD of the department *Russia, Eastern partnership, Central Asia and OSCE* (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) (EEAS 2016: 91).

Due to the EEAS Human Resources Report 2016 and the German government's fifth report on the country's staff representation in international organisations, which were both published in June 2017, two of the 15 non-EUMS directors were now Germans: Roland Schäfer, still in the *Americas* department, and Gerhard Conrad, a German national intelligence official from the Bundesnachrichtendienst as the director of INTCEN since January 2016. Including the EUMS, Heinz Krieb was still and would remain director of the Concepts and Capabilities until September 2018. In addition, Wiegand was now MD for *Asia and Pacific* and Rentschler is still head of Mogherini's team, while Helga Schmid became Secretary General in September 2016 (Deutscher Bundestag 2017: 7; EEAS 2017b: 71).

Table 1 provides an overview of the share of the three largest member states – Germany, the UK, and France – in different categories of the senior and top management and regarding heads of delegation in 2015 and 2016, respectively. Germany was well represented in the higher management in 2015 and 2016. In almost all categories in both years, the German share of the staff was significantly higher than the country's share of the EU population or only slightly below. The only extreme outlier was the country's representation among heads of delegation where its share only amounted to about half of its share of the EU population in both years. Furthermore, more than one more staff would have been needed in both years to reach its share of the population in the category *Total senior management in HQ/delegations*. For the remaining numbers below its share of the EU population (16.1 per cent), an increase by one more staff would have meant a German overrepresentation. Therefore, almost all numbers below its share of the population of the EU are due to statistical issues.

Table 1: Numbers and percentages of high ranking posts in different categories filled by nationals of the three largest EU member states in December 2015 (numbers and percentages of member state officials in brackets)

		Directors (excl. EUMS)		Directors (incl. EUMS)		MD/DG (incl. EUMS)		Total senior management in HQ		Total senior management in HQ/delegations		Heads of delegation		(Deputy) Secretary Generals		Share of EU popu- lation
Year		2015	2016	2015	2016	2015	2016	2015	2016	2015	2016	2015	2016	2015	2016	2015/2016
Total		15 (9)	15 (9)	21 (15)	21 (14)	8* (7)	8 (5)	25*** (18)	29 (20)	48	44	133****	136****	4 (4)	4 (4)	
DE	num- bers	3 (2)	2 (2)	4 (3)	3 (3)	2** (2)	1 (0)	4 (3)	4 (3)	6	5	11	10	1 (1)	1 (1)	16.1%
	share in category	20% (22.2%)	13.3% (22.2%)	19% (20%)	14.3% (21.4%)	25% (28.6%)	12.5% (0%)	16.0% (16.6%)	13.8% (15%)	12,5%	11.4%	8.2%	7.4%	25% (25%)	25% (25%)	
GB	num- bers	2 (2)	1 (1)	2 (2)	1 (1)	2 (1)	1 (1)	4 (3)	2 (2)	7	3	11	8	0 (0)	0 (0)	12.4%
	share in category	13.3% (22.2%)	6.7% (11.1%)	9.5% (13.3%)	4.8% (7.1%)	25% (12.5%)	12.5% (50%)	16.0% (16.6%)	6.9% (10%)	14,6%	6.8%	8.2%	5.9%	0% (0%)	0% (0%)	
FR	num- bers	2 (1)	3 (1)	2 (1)	4 (2)	0	0	2 (1)	4 (2)	3	4	15	15	1 (1)	1 (1)	12.9%
	share in category	13.3% (11.1%)	20.0% (11.1%)	9.5% (6.7%)	19.0% (14.3%)	0%	0%	8.0% (5.6%)	13.8% (10.0%)	6.3%	9.1%	11.3%	11.0%	25% (25%)	25% (25%)	

*4 of which are acting, **these are the two German national officials in the category *Directors (excl. EUMS)*, ***excluding acting MD, ****occupied posts; HQ = headquarters

Source: Data compiled and calculated by the author on basis of EEAS (2016: 80, 83–84, 87, 91, 2017b: 61, 66, 71), EU (2017), and Deutscher Bundestag (2015: 8, 2017: 7).

Comparisons between member states show that there was only one instance where the UK had more staff in absolute terms: In 2015, there were six German but seven British officials in the category *Total senior management in HQ/delegations*. Furthermore, in 2016, France supplied one more director (including and excluding EUMS) than Germany. In all other categories, Germany had more staff in absolute terms. While this can partly be explained by the fact that Germany is bigger than the other two countries, it is important to note that Germany was the only country which was represented in *all* categories in both years. While France did not have a MD or DG in either of the years, Britain was not represented among the (Deputy) Secretary Generals. All in all, Germany's representation in the top positions in the EEAS is significant. One of the interviewees stressed that filling three to four posts in the senior management in total would be a very good value as there are only about 40 such posts (Interview 7).

In general, it is Germany's ambition to get their people into good posts in areas which are priorities of the country (Interviews 10, 12, 13). Some of the positions filled with Germans were regarded as particularly important by officials in the *Auswärtiges Amt* or the Federal Ministry of Defence, such as Gerhard Conrad as the director of INTCEN (Interview 20), Helga Schmid as the Secretary General of the service (Interviews 6, 9, 10), and Oliver Rentschler as the deputy head of Mogherini's Cabinet (Interview 9, 10). Interestingly, the senior official interviewed in the German Ministry of Defence explained that there might be advantages if the High Representative was German. In general, however, not supplying the High Representative is in the country's interests, because a German High Representative would probably be used as an argument against Germany (Interview 20).

Regardless, an imbalance and, therefore, a need for correction is seen in two respects. *First*, the imbalance as regards heads of delegation was bemoaned and, therefore, the appointment of eight more German EU ambassadors in the wake of 41 nominations by Mogherini was appreciated by an official (Interview 7). In fact, Mogherini nominated two *German national diplomats* as heads of delegation in May

2017: Russia (Markus Ederer) and Uruguay (Karl-Otto König). She furthermore appointed six German *EU officials* as EU ambassadors: Australia (Michael Pulch), Benin (Oliver Nette), Cameroon (Hans-Peter Schadek), Mexico (Klaus Rudischhauser), Morocco (Claudia Wiedey), and Singapore (Barbara Plinkert) (EEAS 2017c). In addition, three *German national diplomats* were already serving as heads of delegation at that time: Belarus (Andrea Wiktorin), Gabon (Helmut Kulitz), and West Bank and Gaza (Ralph-Joseph Tarraf). Furthermore, there were already six *German EU officials* working as EU ambassadors: Botswana (Alexander Baum), Burundi (Wolfram Vetter), Iceland (Matthias Brinkmann), Libya (Bettina Muscheidt), Indonesia (Vincent Guérend), Mozambique (Sven Kühn von Burgsdorff), and Singapore (Michael Pulch). As mentioned, Pulch was appointed EU ambassador to Australia but replaced by another German, Barbara Plinkert (EU 2017). In total, 17 Germans, of which five are diplomats of the Auswärtiges Amt, headed a delegation from summer/autumn 2017. Although this number still amounts to 12.2 per cent of all heads of delegation only, it is the highest total number ever achieved by a country, apart from Spain, which had 17 EU ambassadors at that time. While the British representation in this category peaked in 2015 (11 heads of delegation), France supplied 16 heads of delegation in summer 2017, thereby regaining its maximum of 2012 (Deutscher Bundestag 2017: 7; EEAS 2017b: 66).

Second, an overall staff imbalance in terms of quantity was mentioned by several interview partners (Interviews 6, 7, 8, 9). Given that 16.1 % of the EU population lives in Germany, about 50 posts for national officials would statistically appertain to the country insofar as there are currently 300 national diplomats in the EEAS (EEAS 2017a: 39). Table 2 shows the country's share in staff compared to the other major suppliers of human resources – France, the UK, Italy, and Spain – over the last three years.

Table 2: Total numbers and percentages of national officials and EU officials on AD level in the headquarters and in delegations from the five countries that supply most staff

		2014			2015			2016			Share of EU population
		HQ	DEL	SUM	HQ	DEL	SUM	HQ	DEL	SUM	
D	MSD	14 9.5%	8 4.6%	22 6.9%	8 5.7%	15 9.0%	23 7.5%	8 5.7%	10 6.3%	18 6.0%	16.1%
	EUO	52 12.7%	19 9.0%	71 11.5%	54 13.5%	18 8.2%	72 11.6%	50 12.2%	22 9.6%	72 11.3%	
	SUM	64 11.5%	27 7.0%	93 9.9%	62 11.4%	33 8.6%	95 10.2%	58 10.5%	32 8.2%	90 9.6%	
UK	MSD	12 8.2%	17 9.8%	29 9.1%	11 7.8%	19 11.4%	30 9.8%	10 7.1%	19 12.0%	29 9.7%	12.4%
	EUO	21 5.1%	18 8.5%	39 6.3%	23 5.7%	16 7.3%	39 6.3%	23 5.6%	14 6.1%	37 5.8%	
	SUM	33 6.0%	35 9.1%	68 7.2%	34 6.3%	35 9.1%	69 7.4%	33 6.0%	33 8.5%	66 7.2%	
F	MSD	18 12.2%	21 12.1%	39 12.2%	17 12.1%	20 12.0%	37 12.1%	16 11.3%	18 11.3%	34 11.3%	12.9%
	EUO	58 14.2%	23 10.9%	81 13.0%	58 14.5%	23 10.5%	81 13.1%	57 13.9%	23 10.0%	80 12.5%	
	SUM	76 13.7%	44 11.5%	120 12.8%	75 13.8%	43 11.2%	118 12.7%	73 13.2%	41 10.5%	114 12.1%	
I	MSD	12 8.2%	9 5.2%	21 6.6%	10 7.0%	9 5.4%	19 6.2%	10 7.1%	7 4.4%	17 5.7%	12.0%
	EUO	61 15.0%	29 13.7%	90 14.5%	58 14.5%	32 14.6%	90 14.5%	59 14.4%	33 14.3%	92 14.4%	
	SUM	73 13.2%	38 9.9%	111 11.8%	68 12.5%	41 10.6%	109 11.8%	69 15.2%	40 10.3%	109 11.6%	
E	MSD	15 10.2%	13 7.5%	28 8.8%	10 7.1%	12 7.2%	22 7.2%	10 7.1%	12 7.5%	22 7.3%	9.1%
	EUO	36 8.8%	25 11.4%	61 9.9%	37 9.2%	25 11.4%	62 10.0%	35 8.5%	26 11.3%	61 9.5%	
	SUM	51 9.2%	38 9.9%	89 9.5%	47 8.7%	37 9.6%	84 9.1%	45 8.2%	38 9.8%	83 8.8%	
TOTAL	MSD	147	173	320	141	166	307	141	159	300	
	OFF	408	211	619	401	219	620	410	230	640	
	SUM	555	384	939	542	385	927	551	389	940	

MSD = member state diplomats/national officials; EUO = EU officials; HQ = headquarters; DEL = delegations

Source: Data compiled and calculated by the author on basis of EEAS (2015: 37, 55, 2016: 51, 69, 2017b: 39, 50).

Only 18 German national officials, rather than 50, worked for the EEAS in 2016 according to these statistics, which amounted to 6.0 per cent, rather than 16.1 per cent of a total of 300 national officials. Eight national diplomats were in the headquarters in Brussels and 10 in delegations. In addition, there were 72 German EU officials: 50 in the headquarters and 22 in the delegations. This amounted to 11.3 per cent of all EU officials in the EEAS and was thus a slightly better value for Germany. All in all, 90 EEAS staff on AD level had a German passport, which corresponded to 9.5 per cent of the total of 948 administrators. In general, the numbers of Germans in all four categories remained more or less stable from 2014 to 2016.

Principally, this number of national officials working for the EEAS in 2016 requires correction in the eyes of the Auswärtiges Amt. Fifty, rather than 18, German national officials should work for the EEAS which would correspond to the country's size (Interviews 6, 7, 10). Other officials in Berlin argued that there is at least a significant imbalance (Interview 8, 9). In terms of cross-national comparison, it is evident that France was overrepresented in many instances over the three years presented in the table. While Italy was always overrepresented in the two categories of EU officials (HQ and DEL), it was significantly underrepresented among national diplomats in both categories. In absolute numbers, however, both France and Italy had more staff than Germany, although their share of the EU population is clearly lower. While Spain's representation was in most cases more or less in line with its share of the EU population, its total absolute number of staff was only slightly below that of Germany. However, it should be acknowledged that the UK was, compared to its share of the EU population, significantly underrepresented in all instances.

In particular, there is not a single German national official on the level of *Referatsleiter* (head of division) (Interviews 8, 10) in the EEAS headquarters. Hence, a German should soon be assigned to such a post in a division which is of relevance for Germany (Interview 10). This might be an area where the EU has competences, such as competition and trade (Interview 7), or a division where important papers

are dealt with (Interview 9). In spite of the aforementioned claim for a balance in quantity, these wishes imply that quality is regarded as more important. As one interviewee in the Auswärtiges Amt explained, the room of manoeuvre and the significance of particular positions, for example the EU ambassador to Russia, are more important than mere overall quantity (Interview 10).

In fact, the EEAS itself would like to have more Germans within its own ranks, which is not only mentioned by an official in the Auswärtiges Amt (Interview 7) but also reflected by the non-German EEAS official Onestini, who served as the deputy head of the delegation to India until 2017: 'The quality of the German diplomats coming to the EEAS is, in general, quite high. [...] In the candidates that they put forward and present you have some of the best German diplomats [...] So, I would say that the impression is that you do get some very experienced, some very good national diplomats. And they are perceived, I'm sure, as an asset' (Interview 17). Eamon Gilmore, the EEAS's Special Envoy for the Peace Process in Colombia, also stressed that people in the EEAS usually think that they get good diplomats when German officials are sent from Berlin (Interview 16). As the third non-German EEAS official explained, Germany's considerable representation among the top EEAS officials is seen as a necessity by other members as the credibility of the EEAS comes from the member states (Interview 18).

The reason why Germany is underrepresented quantitatively is twofold. On the one hand, this is a simple organisational question of the Foreign Office in Berlin where human resources are limited (Interviews 7, 13). On the other hand, Germany is, as one interview partner explained, too big to be represented proportionally as other countries would then be discriminated (Interview 13). In fact, if posts in the EEAS were allocated proportionally, countries would need 0.3 per cent of the EU population for each post. If this was the case, Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta could not even send a single national diplomat, whereas Slovenia and Latvia could only send one (cf. EEAS 2017b: 51, Interview 10).

Furthermore, it is in Germany's interest if the EEAS is staffed with qualified candidates, even if they are not German (Interview 10), and the country also wants to avoid the impression of quantitative dominance vis-à-vis other member states (Interview 23, 24). In fact, while stating the need of a certain geographical balance (Deutscher Bundestag 2010a: 10), it is important to note that Germany did not push for a particular national quota when the EEAS was established but stressed that the High Representative should decide independently in human resources issues. Professional qualification should be the main criterion for applicants rather than their passport (Deutscher Bundestag 2010a: 10–11). Regardless, the selection process for applicants provides the member states with an opportunity to actively push their candidates as they are selected by a committee. This committee is chaired by the EEAS, but the member states are also represented (Murdoch and Trondal 2015: 112–113). Therefore, as one German official in the Auswärtiges Amt explained, it is not a coincidence if a German ends up in a position which Germany would like to fill (Interview 10). However, representation of the member states in this panel takes place on a rotating basis so that Germany cannot and, apparently, does not want to flood or 'invade' the EEAS with staff. This is very much in line with the argument made below that Germany does not want to dominate or take the EEAS over but influence it in a way which flanks and supports its national policies.

While German staff in key positions can be useful insofar as they may automatically bring in German foreign policy ideas and goals, another important question is whether this resource is actively used by the German Foreign Office. German ministry officials in Berlin stressed that Helga Schmid is indeed an advantageous (Interviews 6, 8, 9) contact, which grants privileged influence (Interview 9). One of the interviewees explained that her role is very helpful insofar as one knows that a concern or request reaches the correct addressee. Sending an email or making a call might be helpful in order to feed in Berlin's concerns or wishes (Interview 6).

More generally, several interviewed German officials in the EEAS explained that Berlin exerts influence both informally, for example through calls to and from

German national officials in Brussels, and formally, especially in the Foreign Affairs Council or in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) (Interviews 11, 12, 13, 14, 25). One of them stressed that Germany is quite successful on the informal level (Interview 12). However, rather than bluntly expressing their wishes, German national officials in the EEAS, as another one of them explained, use the country's power with sure instincts and Germany is more reticent than others precisely because this is more efficient (Interview 11).

This stance seems to be a strategically reasonable approach in the EEAS. Both German and non-German interlocutors in the EEAS stressed that national officials in the EEAS rarely try to represent national positions massively and offensively. It is much more common to do that in a more subtle way (Interviews 12, 17). As Onestini put it, especially 'if you're from a bigger member state and on an issue, with three or four people around the table, the discussion is going one way and you come in and say the opposite and everybody around the table knows that this is the position of the country where you come from, you're not very credible' (Interview 17). Successful national diplomats in the EEAS know both the discussion back home and have regular contacts with their capitals, which mostly applies to higher ranking officials, and also know the debate in Brussels. Therefore, they might be able to bring in some national ideas and to keep their foreign ministry back home informed about the discussion on the European level (Interview 17). This applies to Germany insofar as the country supplies, as shown above, many high-ranking officials. What is more, one of the interviewees confidentially confirmed that German diplomats have, in general, very good access to the Foreign Office in Berlin.

In contrast, a German EEAS official explained that Germany thinks that it can, more than other countries, influence European foreign policy on a formal level (Interview 13), which is also confirmed by non-German officials. Germany does not depend so much on calling its diplomats in the EEAS to exercise influence because it can intervene in decisions through other, more direct, means, be it in the Council working groups or in the PSC (Interview 17). This is also reflected by the former

Tánaiste Eamon Gilmore who said that German foreign ministers are perceived as being among the more powerful and influential figures in the Foreign Affairs Council (Interview 16). As Jean-Claude Juncker once remarked, 'you can never say "Denmark thinks..."', but "'Deutschland denkt..." that is something different' (cited in Tallberg 2008: 690). Onestini furthermore argued that if any member state – in particular the larger ones, including Germany and despite its general strong commitment to CFSP – thinks that action is necessary in a certain policy area, 'they will reserve their right to bilateral or multilateral approaches if they feel that the EU road is too long or is not going to be in line with their country's interests – however we see that this is happening less and less' (Interview 17).

The issue of Germany's staff representation in the EEAS leads to the *second argument* of this chapter. Ederer's roles in Russia and China show that Germany pursues particular policies within and through the EEAS which are important for the country. *First*, several interview partners stressed that his role as the EU's next ambassador to Moscow is essential for Germany (Interviews 6, 9, 10, 24). As several German officials explained, one of the areas where Germany wants the EEAS – and the EU in general – to engage is ENP, especially the Eastern Partnership (Interviews 8, 9, 18, 20). This partnership covers the whole European non-EU part of what Russia also conceives of as a sphere of influence, that is its 'near abroad'. As particularly Germany is also generally highly interested in good relations with Russia, control over, or at least influence on, the EU's diplomatic relations with the country is an essential advantage and decisive for Germany. Non-German observers in Brussels also recognise that Germany is interested in ENP, the Eastern Partnership, and Eastern Europe in general (Interviews 16, 18, 19).

In fact, the crisis in Ukraine, one of the target countries of ENP, is an instance of Germany's aforementioned interest in the EEAS to harmonise different interests within the EU in order to put the EU's common weight in the balance. During the crisis, the EEAS was one of the fora through which conciliation of diverging national interests, such as economic interests, was pursued (Interview 18, 24). For example,

the sanctions against Russia, which were prepared by the EEAS (Interview 18, 24), were powerful only because they were a common action on behalf of all member states (Interview 20, 21). This was also described as one of the examples which show that Germany's support for the European framework is driven by a *Realpolitik*-interest (Interview 21). Furthermore, the EEAS has been of decisive importance as it is, for example, responsible for the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine since December 2014 (Interview 18), which is a mission conducted by the civilian structures that Germany wanted to integrate into the EEAS. Therefore, policy advisor Niklas Helwig described the filling of the position of the EU ambassador to Moscow with a heavy weight from Germany as a good move both for Germany and for the EU because Ederer was very much involved in the negotiations for the Minsk II protocols as secretary of state in the Foreign Office. He therefore knows both the German and the Russian positions on this issue (Interview 24).

Second, Ederer's former role as EU ambassador to China is another instance of how Germany fills posts in areas which are important for the country. The policy advisor and deputy head of the division EU/Europe at SWP, Nicolai von Ondarza, who was involved with the Auswärtiges Amt during the construction period of the EEAS, regarded this staffing as an example of how Germany defended its interests in the EEAS by pushing a German diplomat for a post in an area where Germany has strong interests (Interview 22). In fact, German officials in Berlin and Brussels explained that the EU-China relations are an area where the EEAS should, in Germany's view, be active (Interviews 8, 15). A colleague of an interview partner explained in an off-the-record conversation that Germany was pushing its interest in China when Ederer was EU ambassador in Beijing from 2011 to 2014. At the same time, a German, Jörg Wuttke, held two important posts in China: From 2007 to 2010 and, again, from 2014 to 2017, he was president of the European Union Chamber of Commerce. Furthermore, being still based in China, he served as the chairman of the China Task Force of the Industry Advisory Committee to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (BICA) from 2010 to 2014. According to

the interlocutor, the fact that two Germans were working in these important positions at the same time created a very positive dynamic for Germany.

More generally and in line with the observation in the previous chapter that the EEAS serves as a means to pursue national goals in a multilateral context, one of the non-German interviewees stressed that Germany is *not* an exception when it comes to the 'upload' of national policies: 'all member states do when they think convenient' (Interview 19). In a similar vein, Gilmore explained that all member states try to get other countries closer to their own position, including Germany, despite its generally very European approach to CFSP (Interview 16). This was also reflected by German officials. In accordance with its more general multilateral approach *driven by its national interests*, Germany sometimes tries to find alliances with partners that have the same interests and together they make the EEAS seize on the idea (Interview 9, 11). In fact, regarding the service as an 'amplifier' of national policies and interests is also part of the German logic (Interview 6, 22). Similarly, a retired senior non-German EU official stressed that national interests are 'always top – even in Berlin' (Interview 19).

Very much in line with the political rhetoric over the decade preceding the creation of the common external service, several German officials in Berlin and Brussels agreed that a clear German interest in the EEAS is, in general, to have a louder voice in world politics and to conduct foreign policy more successfully because each single member state, including Germany, is too small on its own (Interviews 6, 8, 10, 11, 14). In this context, the EEAS is seen as an asset because Germany has interests *everywhere in the world* and *in almost all policy areas*, whereas most other EU member states have only single issues or at least less global interests (Interviews 6, 7, 9, 12).

While ENP and Eastern Europe are policy areas which Germany is traditionally interested in, it is therefore important to note that other policy areas and world regions have also become important for the country in the context of the EEAS. For example, Germany has an increasing interest in CSDP (Interviews 9, 10, 15, 17, 20).

Furthermore, in line with Germany's increasing interest in Africa mentioned in the first chapter, several interview partners stressed that the continent is not only becoming more important for Germany, but it is also regarded as a region in which Germany wants the EEAS to take action, since the supranational level is seen as the more effective one (Interview 6, 8, 10, 14, 15). For example, while national solutions, such as fences at Europe's southern border, are not perceived as useful means because they would not solve problems, a stabilisation of the respective African countries is seen as in both Europe's and Germany's interest (Interview 6). The migration partnerships with several African countries, for example, were negotiated with the weight and also the experience of other member states, the EEAS and the Commission (Interview 10). Actually, eight out of the 17 aforementioned German EU ambassadors were deployed in Africa, including hot spots like Libya and traditional countries of the *Françafrique*, the French-speaking regions in Africa that France has traditionally seen as its sphere of influence. These include Cameroon, Gabon, Benin, Morocco, Burundi and, in the past, Mali, Egypt, and South Sudan.

The example of Africa furthermore supports the argument made in the first chapter that Germany benefits from the EEAS insofar as it increases the country's capacities and capabilities. A German EEAS official explained that one of the advantages of the EEAS is that it can draw on the know-how of former colonial powers when formulating interests regarding certain countries in the EEAS, while, at the same time, being less inhibited than these insofar as the EU as such is not fully identified with those historical ties to most formerly colonised countries. This can be an advantage for Germany, too (Interview 11). In addition, Germany can benefit from the knowledge smaller states can provide regarding certain geographical regions or capacities, such as the know-how of Finland in the Arctic Region (Interview 18) or of Austria in training for conflict prevention (Interview 14). Furthermore, information collected from the EU delegations and distributed to the member states does not only help the smaller members but also Germany because it thereby gets new perspectives on different issues (Interviews 12, 14). In line with the argument made in

chapter one, this clearly refutes the argument that the EEAS only increases the capabilities of smaller states which have smaller budgets, less comprehensive capacities, and more limited diplomatic networks.

The *third argument* of this chapter will deal with those cases in which German interests do not fit European or the aggregated interests of other member states. In this context, two points should be noted. *First*, it is important to consider the EEAS's nature as an institution which is, very similar to foreign ministries of nation states, predominantly concerned with preparation and implementation of decisions, rather than decision-making. The non-German EEAS official Onestini also explained why the issue of clashing or dominant interests is not so much a problem in the EEAS: 'I don't think there is any scenario in which any member state can use these instances in order to get their way against the will of the others. Because that's not how the decision-making is set up. The decision-making is primarily through the national bodies and the Council' (Interview 17). While this does, of course, mean that even Germany cannot push through its interests against the will of others in an institution like the EEAS, it also implies that it is never at risk of being marginalised in the service, not even by a coalition of other big member states. The logic of how such a bureaucracy works is simply different to situations in which blatant power counts. Therefore, the EEAS is more about *influencing*, rather than dominating, policies. As explained before, Germany follows this logic successfully by prioritising key posts and those positions which are relevant for the country over a quantitatively dominant staff representation.

In light of the previous argumentation, it is important to note that this corresponds to the German approach of a fair balancing of interests and multilateralism. Even if there are tensions between particular German and more general European interests, Germany is said to have an attitude which aims to overcome conflicts of interests. This is not only claimed by German decision-makers, as shown in the previous chapter, but also substantiated by remarks of the interviewees. For example, the perception of the non-German official Eamon Gilmore is that Germany's nation-

al interests and European interests do not necessarily collide insofar as Germany's goal usually is to reach agreement on a common position among member states (Interview 16). Matussek explained that Germany is usually interested in the superordinate goal of European integration and might, therefore, sometimes agree to things which are not necessarily in its direct national interest (Interview 5). As had always been the case on a more abstract level, this shows that Germany is very pragmatic when it comes to dissonances among member states insofar as it is willing to partly 'sacrifice' its own wishes if agreement on a common European position can be achieved. Regardless, one of the German officials in the EEAS explained that the interests of some countries are sometimes automatically anticipated by others insofar as they know that a specific topic might be a sensitive issue for a particular country. Contrary to this issue-specific automatism, Germany is the only country whose interests are normally *always* anticipated (Interview 12). Therefore, Germany does not run the risk of being marginalised, even if it does not express its wishes explicitly.

A *second* issue concerns potential tensions between European and German interests which might arise outside the EEAS and the role the service might play in resolving these tensions. The Ukraine crisis was, as shown above, retrospectively described as an example where action on the supranational level complemented and flanked German foreign policy. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that this is not true for all stages of the crisis. In fact, it was one of the three major crises over the last eight years or so – along with the Euro and the refugee crises – which has been regarded as an existential threat to the EU and revealed significant clashes between different interests, not least German interests and those of others. In fact, the clashes at the height of the crisis were so drastic that German foreign policy evoked traditional resentments, rather than lifting the burdens from Germany by a considerate balancing of interests. This was illustrated by the vice chairman for foreign policy of the SPD parliamentary group Mützenich:

A significant example for me is Steinmeier's experience at the height of the Ukraine crisis when he was, in an informal setting, addressed 'Herr Ribbentrop' by an East European colleague. Not only did this underscore the reproach [that Germany might be too dominant in foreign policy] but people also keep thinking in these historical categories – that the Germans agree on something with the Russians, that they hand over lands and the like, that they divide, so to speak, a particular European space between them. This still plays a role for me until today. (Interview 4, author's translation)

During the last five to eight years or so, as the political analyst and fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations Cornelius Adebahr, explained, Germany has actually acted more and more bilaterally. Although this is done on the assumption that this is 'benevolent bilateralism', which supposes that Germany's actions are in the European interest as well, this might sometimes block European interests (Interview 25). However, as Mützenich continued, it becomes evident why the Ukraine crisis is, as explained before, *retrospectively* assessed as an instance, in which German interests and those of others were balanced, not least through the EEAS: 'As a consequence of that [...] we try, besides the Minsk process, to build up fora, channels in order to not appear as that kind of Germany which manages the Ukraine crisis with the Russians. But we say, "We can do that only if we have partners on our side"' (Interview 4). In this sense, the EEAS should not so much be seen as an institution, in which tensions between interests arise, but rather as a body which might help to resolve such tensions that evolve outside the service.

Regardless, Germany has, as a German official in Berlin explained, recently realised that it is becoming more difficult to play its role as a mediator who tries to balance its own and other member states' interests. The main reason is that Germany's power has lately increased. In the past, it had often been the case that Germany advanced and other member states, such as the Visegrád Four, went along voluntarily. Recently, this has happened less frequently (Interview 6). In fact, a German EEAS official explained that Germany is worried about the recent tendency that some countries try to block initiatives or policies in the Council – not in the EEAS – at the last minute (Interview 12).

However, Germany's and German nationals' approach within the EEAS in particular, and European Foreign Policy in general, is described as considerate, both by German and non-German officials (Interviews 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18), not least because they do not want to induce fears or be perceived as a threat (Interview 9, 18, 23, 24). In general, Germany is, compared to other areas such as economic and financial questions, therefore not seen as dominant in European foreign policy in general or the EEAS in particular (Interviews 6, 11, 13, 15, 22, 24). This view is shared by all non-German EEAS officials (16, 17, 18). All interviewed non-German senior officials in the EEAS also think that Germany is committed to CFSP and that it has a European approach therein (Interviews 16, 17, 18). Germany is still regarded as a country which tries to bring in others as well and find compromises which are also acceptable for other member states (Interviews 6, 16, 18). This is reflected by the remarks of German national diplomats in the EEAS who stressed that they are not instruments of Berlin (Interviews 11, 14). Therefore, Germans are seen 'with high regard and most genuine Europeans' (Interview 19).

In fact, a non-German EEAS official said that there is the impression that Germany's commitment to compromises does not exclude a national position. Rather, this strong commitment can be explained by the German approach to decision-making and implies some degree of 'self-control' (Interview 18). This resembles the aforementioned semantic difference between *inclusion* (*Einbindung*), which *constrains them as Germans but mobilises them as Europeans*, and the somewhat more ambivalent term *self-restraint* (*Selbstbeschränkung*). In fact, Germany is not even against leadership but it wants to exercise it together with others (Interview 13). In a similar vein, the Ministry of Defence official described the EU in general, and the EEAS in particular, as a framework for Germany wherein it can act without arousing, albeit unjustified, suspicion (Interview 20). Taken together, this clearly reflects Germany's approach that is decisively characterised and driven by the conviction that multilateral and integrationist balancing of interests do much better serve the German interest than unilateral action.

Conclusion: The German Question and the European External Action Service

In March 2017, British Prime Minister Theresa May notified ‘the European Council in accordance with Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union of the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the European Union’ (May 2017: 1). Many people feared that the decision of the British to trigger Article 50 and to realise *Brexit* could result in a domino effect. Would the Dutch follow suit with a *Nexit*? Would a *Frexit* lead to the ultimate dissolution of the whole EU? In contrast to the linguistic creativity to describe potential withdrawals of several countries from the integration project, commentators, however, barely felt obliged to invent an expression for a German EU exit – *Dexit* or *Gexit* was simply not a phenomenon. On the contrary, almost at the same time when Germany proposed to establish a common European diplomatic service in the European Convention, the delegate of the Bundestag to the European Convention Jürgen Meyer submitted an amendment form aiming at the removal of then ‘Article 46’ which referred to ‘[v]oluntary withdrawal from the Union’ because ‘[t]he explicit inclusion of a withdrawal clause is incompatible with a European Constitution and with the integration objective shared by all Member States of “creating an ever closer union among the peoples in Europe”’ (Meyer 2003: 1218).

In discussing Germany’s interests in proposing and supporting the establishment of the EEAS, this paper suggests that it is no coincidence that *Germany*, rather than another member state, asked to remove this paragraph. One may or may not share this opinion from an analytical point of view, but in the eyes of German decision-makers, including governments of all political colours, European integration is regarded as Germany’s success story after World War II as it had both brought about and combined multilateralism and (the promotion of) peace – the main principles of German foreign policy. In this context, the crises in the Balkans reinforced these principles and, therefore, provided the general condition of a con-

viction to further promote integration, not least in common foreign policy. But the return of war to Europe triggered the proposal of a common diplomatic service also directly insofar as it was seen as the solution to the crises in former Yugoslavia which corresponded to the German approach of foreign policy in several ways. Taking on greater responsibility in a peace promoting and multilateral way, however, would also be necessary beyond Europe. While preserving peace and cooperative international relations on a global scale was seen as a necessity for the country's direct interest in prosperity and security, there has been a clear awareness of the waning influence of the European nation state. Only through a common voice, for which a diplomatic body is essential, would Europe be able to face these challenges.

This narrative of the waning influence of the European nation state – often called the narrative of globalisation – is not new but it is important to note that it was seen as becoming more and more decisive as an explanation for why Germany supported the EEAS. Only if the European states were able to balance their interests, rather than letting them clash, potentially producing chaos in Europe, Germany's success story would continue. The common efforts of the three largest EU member states in the Iran negotiations and the later inclusion of the embryonic predecessor of the EEAS therein reinforced, as the Kosovo crisis had done before, the need for a common diplomatic service. Similar to France and Britain, Germany supports the common service in order to compensate for the waning influence of the European nation state, whereas the approaches are much different. In fact, a common diplomatic service should be based on the German idea of foreign policy through *civilian* power. After all, Germany is convinced that its own approach is superior to that of other countries, such as Britain or France.

From a German perspective, the pivotal element is, first and foremost, integration, not the nation state. While Brexit discussions revolved around the question whether the country is 'better off' on its own or as part of a greater entity, German decision-makers and officials have in several ways drawn the lesson from history that Germany is better positioned as part of a greater entity. The Germans are better

off with a nation state, rather than territorial fragmentation, which imports conflict to the heart of Europe and is the one side of the German problem. What is even more important is the experience that Germany is much better off with the EU also because unilateral German action exports conflict to the rest of Europe. Avoiding this other incarnation of the German problem is, in the eyes of decision-makers and officials, in Germany's direct national interest as well.

Regardless, being the largest country in Europe, Germany is very well positioned to play an important role in the EEAS. Continuously filling key positions among the high-ranking officials in the headquarters of the service and in delegations around the world, Germany's presence in the EEAS is remarkable. But they do not flood the service quantitatively, which would not be in line with the German approach of multilateralism. Germany's example also shows that it is not only the smaller member states which benefit from the additional capabilities of the EEAS. More importantly, the EEAS serves as a new but prime instrument to resolve tensions among different interests, at least in the perception of Germany.

In the end, Germany's stance within the EEAS also reveals the strange and ambivalent nature of the EU, in which a country might be hegemonic and not at the same time. Although this paper has not aimed at answering a theoretical question or applying a particular theory, certain theoretical implications are, as already pointed out in the introduction, always inherent in political, as well as academic statements. As repeatedly stressed by German decision-makers, German foreign policy is *interest-driven, as well as based on norms*. Even though it is beyond question that most of the statements quoted or referred to here reveal the speaker's belief in certain norms as ends in themselves or because they serve a greater good, it also became evident that German national interests and the need to safeguard them – in, within, and through the EEAS – are, more often than not, emphasised. As a matter of fact, the belief in, and adherence to, particular norms is stressed *precisely because* this is regarded as in Germany's national interests of security and prosperity. Limiting Germany's belief in norms to a mere rational calculation would stretch the point. How-

ever, from a rational point of view of *Realpolitik* held by Germany, the country is much better positioned *because* it upholds these norms. That being said, German foreign policy seems, at least to a significant degree, to be driven by rational considerations of norms (cf. Wendt 1999: 287), although these norms are internalised so much so that they are not put into question (anymore).

Nothing is without alternative – from a logical point of view, a decision between action and no action always remains. Hence, there is no legal barrier to a German withdrawal from the EU. In contrast, this paper suggests that triggering Article 50 would never be an option for the overwhelming majority of German decision-makers, politicians and senior officials alike. Integration has not only solved the German problem, but in answering the German Question, thereby producing peace, security and prosperity in Central Europe for seven decades, it has also made Germany the big winner of integration. Integration is not only seen as a way to constrain the people at the heart of Europe *as Germans* but a means to mobilise them *as Europeans* in their own national interest. Rather than perceiving previous integration as the yoke which must be cast off, it must be extended. Only if Europe has the institutional infrastructure, that is a common European External Action Service, to speak with one voice both to its neighbours and on the global stage, Germany will still be a big winner in the future. And in light of the experience that Germany's approach in foreign policy, which is driven by these two principles of multilateralism and peace, there is a strong sense that Germany's approach should be the approach of the EEAS and that German interests must be safeguarded in these common diplomatic structures.

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